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The Once and Future Property-Based Vision
of the First Amendment
John 0. McGinnist
INTRODUCTION: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
CHANGING SOCIAL THOUGHT
The growth of the information superhighway depends not
only on technological developments, but also on our society's
commitment to the free flow of information. Paradoxically, how-
ever, as the digital revolution in telecommunications is bringing
the information superhighway into sharp focus, the justifications
for contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence are becoming
blurred.
For about the last fifty years, free speech has been the pre-
eminent constitutional right, continually expanded by Supreme
Court justices of varying jurisprudential views to protect ever
more varied and vigorous expression. With few exceptions, this
development has been welcomed by jurists and academics across
the political spectrum. Given this consensus, the concept of free-
dom of speech has also taken deep roots in our popular and polit-
ical culture.' Now, however, the social paradigm that was the
source of the expansion is being challenged, and with it the foun-
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dations of the First Amendment theory that protected so much
expression.
Much of the impetus for the First Amendment's ascension to
the apex of constitutional law lies in the New Deal's ideal of
social democracy and the subsequent transformation of the feder-
al government into a vigorous instrument of social reform. To
gain the centralized authority necessary for large scale social
reform, the federal government had to liberate itself from the
features of the original design that had been intended to limit its
power.2 Thus, the structural checks of federalism and separation
of powers were substantially weakened.' Moreover, substantive
restraints on governmental programs imposed by constitutionally
protected property rights all but disappeared.4 With the dissolu-
tion of these venerable checks on the power of the state, the
Court had to look elsewhere for a mechanism for restraining such
power, and located it in the reasoned deliberations of citizens in
the democratic process.5 Under this new model, the citizens' abil-
ity to engage in sustained social criticism and vote their rulers
out would prevent a powerful state from becoming a tyrannical
one.
If the ability of citizens to criticize and ultimately replace the
government was to contain the power of the state, the First
Amendment naturally had to take center stage as the principal
means of guaranteeing "open political dialogue and process."6 If
2 As discussed below, the original Constitution envisaged a limited government
whose primary purpose was to protect individual rights, rather than to reform society
through collective processes. See notes 84-86, 125 and accompanying text.
' For a discussion of the collapse of federalism, see Richard A. Epstein, The Proper
Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 Va L Rev 1387 (1987). For a discussion of the collapse of
separation-of-powers restraints, see Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative
State, 107 Harv L Rev 1231, 1248-49 (1994).
' See, for example, West Coast Hotel Co. v Parrish, 300 US 379 (1937) (rejecting the
notion that existing property distributions deserve special protection). The transformation
of social thought that led to the declining willingness of the courts to enforce economic
liberties is detailed in G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism:
Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 Va L Rev 999
(1972).
' See David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 Colum L Rev 1699, 1734-37
(1991) (understanding increased First Amendment protections after the New Deal as a
way of preserving majority control of the newly empowered state). The theory of the First
Amendment developed in the post-New Deal era to promote democratic deliberation was
not entirely novel; it had roots in the progressive era and in the theories of Zechariah
Chafee, Jr. See Mark A. Graber, Transforming Free Speech: The Ambiguous Legacy of
Civil Libertarianism 125 (California 1991) ("In [Chafee's] writings, free speech was ... a
procedural prerequisite of any democratic society."). See also id at 122-26, 140-64 (de-
scribing Chafee's theory of free speech).
' See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 112 (Har-
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the government were to engineer fundamental social change, free
speech had to encourage the widest possible dissemination of
social ideas and political programs. Moreover, free speech was
needed so that constant criticism of the results of past reform
could be used to improve future schemes.7 On this view, al-
though the First Amendment protected all sorts of political ex-
pression, it was no longer understood as a right of the individual,
like a right of property.8 It was instead understood as an essen-
tial social instrument through which citizens could be assured of
a continual ability to rationally and collectively plan for a better
world.9
Although the perfection of collective democratic processes
was the most important rationale for the expansion of free speech
during this period, it was not the only one. The architects of the
new consensus believed that the economic arrangements of civil
society-the order created by the exercise of property
rights-should be subject to perpetual revision and control
through the central government.'0 They also recognized, howev-
yard 1980) (stating that the "central function" of the First Amendment is to "assur[e] an
open political dialogue and process").
' See, for example, Roth v United States, 354 US 476, 484 (1957) (The First Amend-
ment "was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes .. ").
This new theory replaced a more self-consciously libertarian theory of the First
Amendment, now all but forgotten, that was popular in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. The previous view had protected speech rights by equating them with
property rights; both were natural rights of the individual that the government had only a
limited power to regulate. See Graber, Transforming Free Speech at 18 (cited in note 5)
(listing a host of theorists and judges who believed that "a legislature had no more busi-
ness regulating expression than it had regulating property"). See also id at 17-49 (de-
scribing views of conservative libertarians who equated speech and property rights). Some
of the judicial decisions from that era presage the theory of the First Amendment offered
in this Article. See note 187.
' Indeed, by the 1960s this transformation had gone so far that the leading theorist
of the First Amendment expressly cast the First Amendment entirely as a right of gover-
nance, not as a right of the individual:
The First Amendment does not protect a "freedom to speak." It protects the freedom
of those activities of thought and communication by which we "govern." It is con-
cerned, not with a private right, but with a public power, a governmental responsibil-
ity.
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 S Ct Rev 245, 255. John
Hart Ely also interpreted the Warren Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, and indeed
its civil rights jurisprudence generally, as an attempt to perfect the democratic process.
See Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 105-25 (cited in note 6).
" For a discussion of this aspect of the New Deal consensus, see Cass R. Sunstein,
The Partial Constitution 40-67 (Harvard 1993).
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er, the need for a personal sphere beyond the reach of centralized
authority, within which individuals could work to achieve self-
realization. Indeed, it was the existence of this personal sphere
that they felt was one of the most important demarcations sepa-
rating the modern welfare states of the West, including the
United States, from the communist states of the East." Once
again, the First Amendment stepped to the fore because it
seemed a perfect instrument for protecting this personal
sphere.' Nonpolitical speech was understood as a means to self-
realization that could be distinguished from market processes. 3
Although, in a social democracy, economic enterprise was viewed
as an engine of exploitation and inequality necessarily subject to
strict government supervision, expressive activity was seen as
merely personal and thus beyond the need for government con-
trol. Hence, in the model of social democracy, the First Amend-
ment as a right of self-expression thrived in symbiosis with the
First Amendment as an instrument of self-governance to provide
substantial safeguards for both political and nonpolitical speech. 4
1 See Richard Lowenthal, The Future of Socialism in the Advanced Democracies, in
Leszek Kolakowski and Stuart Hampshire, eds, The Socialist Idea: a reappraisal 222, 222-
25 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1974) (stating that Western social democracy, unlike commu-
nism, seeks a regime that combines personal autonomy with social control over economic
forces).
12 See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U Pa L Rev 591 (1982). The
self-realization strand of First Amendment theory was not entirely novel. Before the New
Deal, social radicals, such as anarchists and advocates of free love, championed robust
First Amendment protections to promote individual autonomy in the personal sphere. See
David M. Rabban, The Free Speech League, the ACLU, and Changing Conceptions of Free
Speech in American History, 45 Stan L Rev 47, 52-54 (1992). For a general history and
discussion of the organized groups that defended freedom of expression in the era before
World War I and the founding of the ACLU, see id at 47-99.
1" See C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures
and Redish's The Value of Free Speech, 130 U Pa L Rev 646, 653-54 (1982) (distinguish-
ing free speech that allows self-realization from speech dictated by the market).
14 See Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 6-7 (Random House
1970) (envisioning the First Amendment from the dual perspective of self-realization and
self-governance theories).
The social democratic expansion of the First Amendment, of course, was not em-
braced with the same fervor by all points on the political and jurisprudential spectrum.
Not surprisingly, egalitarian social democrats, seeking both a powerful, democratically
legitimated government and a personal sphere of autonomy and self-realization, were the
strongest supporters of both rationales for broad readings of the First Amendment.
Conservatives and libertarians did not celebrate powerful governmental entities designed
to revise private economic arrangements. However, conceding that a powerful state
existed, conservatives and libertarians agreed that public debate might improve, and
perhaps even restrain, the overweening state. Thus, they largely acquiesced in the politi-
cal process rationale for First Amendment expansion, although conservatives often sought
to except extremist speech from the ambit of the Amendment's protection. See Robert H.
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind L J 1, 20 (1971)
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The foundations on which the First Amendment theories of
the last several decades have rested are collapsing for two inter-
related reasons. First, the New Deal consensus on the role of
government has dissipated. At the level of election returns, the
party opposing the expansion of the state has been making sub-
stantial electoral gains."5 The election returns themselves, how-
ever, are but epiphenomena of deeper difficulties for the social
democratic paradigm exemplified by the New Deal. Public choice
theory has cast doubt on the coherence and efficacy of collective
decision making."6 Furthermore, the rise of natural, as opposed
to merely cultural, explanations for human social ordering raises
questions about the malleability of human society.' For in-
stance, under a view emphasizing the natural roots of human
behavior, rent seeking-the practice by which one faction uses
the democratic process to expropriate the wealth of another-is
(suggesting that political speech should be protected by the First Amendment, but making
an exception for extremist speech that calls for the forcible overthrow of the government).
Many traditional conservatives were much less enthusiastic about the self-realization
rationale for the protection of First Amendment rights because they believed that such
expression could disrupt the delicate harmony of civil society, which in their view depend-
ed on the acceptance of traditional social norms and proprieties. See Donald Alexander
Downs, The New Politics of Pornography 27-28, 101-03 (Chicago 1989) (discussing tradi-
tional conservatives' interest in regulating pornography). Nevertheless, the views of tra-
ditional conservatives rarely prevailed, as the First Amendment was expanded to protect
indecent and offensive expression. See, for example, Cohen v California, 403 US 15 (1971)
(public display of expletive protected by the First Amendment); Erznoznik v City of
Jacksonville, 422 US 205 (1975) (invalidating city ordinance making it a public nuisance
for a drive-in movie theater to show nudity if movie screen is visible from public area).
"5 See Dan Balz, GOP Takes Over; House Sets Off at Quick Pace: Euphoric Republi-
cans Ready for Great Debate on Government's Role, Wash Post Al (Jan 5, 1995) (discuss-
ing historic realignment of the 1994 congressional elections).
"s See Dennis C. Mueller, Public choice II: A revised edition of Public Choice 406
(Cambridge 1989) (stating that modern public choice theorems "raise fundamental ques-
tions about the possibility of establishing collective choice procedures satisfying minimally
appealing normative properties").
7 It is impossible to open the newspaper or enter a bookstore without being confront-
ed by arguments that stress the natural constraints on social ordering. One recent exam-
ple of a best-selling book offering such explanations is Robert Wright, The Moral Animal:
Evolutionary Psychology and Everyday Life 3-15 (Pantheon 1994) (arguing that human
society is structured around the human mind, which was adapted through evolution).
While these kinds of arguments have reached the general public only recently, a revival of
biologically based explanations of human behavior and social structure has been under-
way in the social sciences for the last two decades. See, for example, Carl N. Degler, In
Search of Human Nature: The Decline and Revival of Darwinism in American Social
Thought (Oxford 1991) (describing the rise of evolutionary thinking in psychology, linguis-
tics, anthropology, and economics). For a discussion of the way in which the renewed
importance of human nature in the social sciences may move the interpretation of the en-
tire Constitution back toward its original meaning, see John 0. McGinnis, The Original
Constitution and Our Origins, 19 Harv J L & Pub Policy (forthcoming 1996).
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seen as an inherent difficulty of collective decision making, be-
cause individuals are designed by hundreds of thousands of years
of evolution to seek wealth and status for themselves." Finally,
insofar as human society is ordered in relatively intractable
ways, a governmental structure designed to facilitate large-scale
and continuous revision of social arrangements seems generally
less attractive. 9
If social democracy is likely to be less coherent and less effec-
tive than once thought, there is less reason to understand the
First Amendment as a means to protect information inputs for
facilitating the collective democratic process. More information,
for instance, is not going to create a coherent agenda of social
reform if incoherence is an inevitable result of pooling individual
preferences through democratic decision making." Nor is more
information going to change the biologically based nature of man
that drives costly rent seeking in the democratic welfare state.
The collective governance rationale for protecting speech weakens
as the old social democratic paradigm begins to lose its luster.
In addition to the dissipation of the New Deal consensus on
the role of government, the self-realization rationale of past de-
cades is also being eroded. Information transmission is now in-
creasingly understood to be identical in important aspects to the
" See generally Mueller, Public choice 11 at 229-46 (cited in note 16) (discussing rent
seeking and its implications for political processes). Indeed, there is a close connection
between the rise of public choice as an explanation for law and politics and the rise of
evolutionary biology in the social sciences generally. Public choice explains political
actions as motivated by the rational self-interest of individual actors. See Daniel A.
Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction 22 (Chicago
1991). Evolutionary biology explains why such self-interest is likely to be hard-wired in
man. See Wright, Moral Animal at 336-37 (cited in note 17) ("[Slelf-absorption is the hall-
mark of life on this planet. Organisms are things that act as if their welfare were more
important than the welfare of all other organisms (except [ I when other organisms can
help spread their genes).").
"9 This point about the difficulty of social reform does not rest simply on the fact that
much human behavior is rooted in our biological nature. Even social scientists who believe
that there is an important biological component of human behavior agree that the behav-
ior is a result of a complex interaction between nature and environment. See Wright,
Moral Animal at 8-9 (cited in note 17). The environment, however, is itself a very diffuse
phenomenon, and we generally know relatively little about how to manipulate it so that
the resulting interaction with the natural impulses and endowments of man will change
social behavior for the better. See, for example, James Q. Wilson, From Welfare Reform to
Character Development, Address Before the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research 9,
19-20 (Nov 17, 1994) (on file with U Chi L Rev) (observing difficulty of reducing the rate of
illegitimacy by changing the environment).
0 For an explanation of why collective decision making that uses the intuitively ap-
pealing properties desired by most democracies results in inconsistency, see Mueller,
Public choice 11 at 384-407 (cited in note 16) (describing various social welfare functions).
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economic activity attendant to the exchange of material proper-
ty."' First, information is more than ever seen as a product to be
exchanged, formally and informally, and as a prime source of
wealth in society.2 Even when a product is not itself informa-
tion-based, expression, in the form of advertising, creates the
market for material products. Moreover, research into our evolu-
tionary heritage confirms that the human faculty of speech
evolved to improve economic well-being, both by facilitating the
exchange of goods and by creating another product for ex-
change-namely information itself." Information production of
all kinds is thus increasingly seen as directed toward the acquisi-
tion of wealth and status, and no longer seems well suited for
carving out a sphere of self-realization that is separate from the
market.24 Expressive man is economic man.
One of the consequences of the crisis confronting the old
rationales for the First Amendment is that the left and right
sides of the political spectrum in the United States are increas-
ingly switching sides on free speech issues.' If information
transmission is understood as intertwined with the mar-
ket-becoming an extension, indeed a source, of inequality rather
1 Indeed, the very name increasingly given to our age-the Information
Age-suggests that expression of any kind is not a category easily confined to the person-
al sphere.
' See Walter B. Wriston, The Twilight of Sovereignty: How the Information Revolu-
tion is Transforming Our World 18-39 (Scribner's Sons 1992) (arguing that information
has itself become an important source of wealth). During the 1980s the United States
invested over one trillion dollars in information technology. See Fred H. Cate, The First
Amendment and the National Information Infrastructure, 30 Wake Forest L Rev 1, 5
(1995), citing Howard Gleckman, The Technology Payoff, Bus Week 57 (June 14, 1993).
Over one half of employees in the United States work in information-based jobs. Cate, 30
Wake Forest L Rev at 5.
' For a discussion of the evolution of speech and the advantages it provided in fa-
cilitating the exchange of information and other goods, see Steven Pinker, The Language
Instinct 365-69 (Morrow 1994). For more complete discussion of the implications of the
evolving uses of speech for understanding the First Amendment, see John 0. McGinnis,
Information Transmission and Human Nature: Evolutionary Biology and Free Speech (on
file with U Chi L Rev).
4 Professor Kathleen Sullivan recently suggested that speech activity is fundamen-
tally different from economic activity because speech seeks to change individuals' prefer-
ences while consumer goods seek to serve these preferences. See Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Free Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 UCLA L Rev 949, 963 (1995). This distinction is open
to doubt: over the course of human history, new technologies and goods have changed
preferences as much as new ideas. Indeed, whole theories of history see political ideas as
driven by technological change. In any event, the point here is that individuals express
themselves primarily for the same reason they engage in material market activities: to
advance their position in the world.
' For a discussion of the changing leftist thought on free speech, see John 0.
McGinnis, The Left vs. Free Speech, 100 Commentary 59 (Oct 1994).
The University of Chicago Law Review
than an essential part of the process for remedying it-the left
will look more kindly on regulation of speech. Likewise, if infor-
mation transmission is at bottom a means of wealth creation,
rather than merely self-expression likely to disturb the social
fabric, the right will be less eager to regulate it.26 This change of
positions is confirmed in academic writings and case law; wheth-
er the issue is hate speech, commercial speech, or supervision of
the information superhighway, the left is more inclined to regu-
late and the right is more inclined toward laissez-faire." When
Harvard University awards a prize to a book that calls for more
government regulation of speech in the interest of promoting
democracy, epochal change is in the air.28
This Article chooses a road that diverges sharply from that
taken by current self-governance theorists of the First Amend-
ment. It seeks to cleanse the First Amendment of the obscuring
varnish of social democracy and reveal its true origins as a prop-
erty right of the individual, thus providing a model for an emerg-
ing laissez-faire jurisprudence. In fact, the property-centered
vision of the First Amendment offered here reflects the views of
its principal drafter: James Madison.29 While contemporary
scholars have utterly and inexplicably ignored Madison's proper-
ty-centered vision of the First Amendment, Madison believed that
individuals possessed a property right in their ideas and opinions
just as surely as they possessed a property right in the material
goods they fashioned. Madison also understood that the ability to
transmit information, either through one's own person (free
26 For another interesting analysis of the reasons the left is now interested in speech
regulation, see Burt Neuborne, Blues for the Left Hand: A Critique of Cass Sunstein's De-
mocracy and the Problem of Free Speech, 62 U Chi L Rev 423, 429 (1995) (suggesting that
the lack of enthusiasm for robust free speech is that left-leaning reformers "currently lack
an affirmative political program of their own").
27 See Shiffrin, 69 Ind L J at 689-91 (cited in note 1) (discussing the reversal of the
positions of the left and the right on First Amendment issues).
' The Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy at the
John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard awarded the Goldsmith Book Prize to
Cass R. Sunstein's Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (Free Press 1993). For a
discussion and critique of this book's prescriptions for more regulation of speech, see notes
288-321 and accompanying text.
While Sunstein's redeployment of the self-governance theory in the service of in-
creased regulation may seem curious at first, it is in fact a logical outcome of that theory's
underlying structure. Because the self-governance theory views free speech as an instru-
ment of a collective good-social democracy-rather than as an end in itself, the deregula-
tion that it previously promoted was always contingent on the usefulness of free speech
toward that good. Regulation becomes appropriate when a new understanding of the
effects of speech makes regulation necessary for advancing the cause of social reform.
' For a fuller discussion of the drafting history of the First Amendment, see Part I.
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speech) or through the use of other material property (free press)
needed special protection from government interference." Be-
cause information transmission can threaten the interests of the
rulers more substantially and more immediately than material
production, rulers have a greater incentive to suppress and regu-
late these rights. On this view, however, the function of the First
Amendment is not to promote the collective interest in self-gover-
nance; the function of the First Amendment is to prohibit regula-
tion of an important property right peculiarly threatened by the
government.
Although the construction of the Free Speech and Free Press
Clauses that emerges from the property-based view of the First
Amendment is rooted in the natural rights of the individual,3' it
also results in substantial social benefits, particularly in the In-
formation Age. Indeed, I argue that a property-based system in
which the First Amendment simply protects the individual's right
to transmit his information is more likely to result in sound col-
lective governance, and the accumulation of socially beneficial
knowledge, than a system of information transmission regulated
by a central sovereign authority for any reason other than to
prevent the loss of property or life through force or fraud.32
The growth of cyberspace-the medium replacing the tradi-
tional press and television as the primary medium of communica-
tion-promises infinitely expandable opportunities for the trans-
mission of ideas, opinions, promises, and commitments. In so
doing, cyberspace makes the property-based vision an even more
robust conceptualization of the First Amendment than it was in
Madison's time.33 To be sure, scarce resources such as telephone
I define "information" in this article broadly. As Professor Farber suggests, our
common usage of the term encompasses speech that "does not necessarily communi-
cate... new data." See Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice
and the First Amendment, 105 Harv L Rev 554, 555 n 8 (1991). For instance, many forms
of argument offer new ways of looking at old data; they are nevertheless valuable. See id.
Indeed, I would include within my definition of information not only statements that
reveal objective data but also statements that reveal an individual's affect toward another
or his future course of conduct. Such information also may be of great value to the indi-
vidual who transmits it. For further development of these ideas, see text accompanying
notes 141-46.
" The implications of the property-based vision for First Amendment doctrine are
sketched in Part 11.
' In Part IV, I argue that the property-based model of the First Amendment is
paradoxically more successful than either the self-governance or self-realization models in
promoting the goals of self-governance and self-realization.
' Part III discusses the implications for cyberspace and emerging telecommunica-
tions media. In particular, it shows that the Supreme Court, in Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v FCC, 114 S Ct 2445 (1994), failed to appreciate the property-centered
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wires, satellites, and other networks are needed to create
cyberspace, but modern technology is providing competitive op-
tions to transmit information at decreasing costs. The Internet is
already experiencing explosive growth, but it is an obscure path
in the primeval forest compared with the reticulated arteries,
including byways for specialized commercial purposes, and thor-
oughfares for video and multimedia communication, that will
soon be established. Simply by protecting the right of information
transmission, the property-based vision of the First Amendment
provides greater assurance than ever before that those with use-
ful information will find a path to convey it.
I. THE MADISONIAN FIRST AMENDMENT
The advocates of free expression in seventeenth- and eigh-
teenth-century England were of two kinds: those who defended
free speech as an instrument to some collective good, and those
who defended it as a natural property right of the individual that
was an end in itself. The former defense is familiar to American
students of the First Amendment because it was the forerunner
of current views that defend freedom of speech as a means of
achieving self-governance. For instance, Areopagitica's famous
plea for freedom from licensing laws rested not on the proposition
that free speech was a right inherent in the individual, but on
the view that free speech was a necessary means of discovering
divine truth.34 Milton argued for freedom from prior restraint
because only through the application of the diversity of human
intelligence could mankind successfully recover the divine order
that had been lost in a fallen world. 5 For Milton, freedom of
speech was an instrument, rather than a goal, and thus his ap-
proach to that liberty has an outlook wholly different from an
approach centered in individual rights.36 In fact, Milton believed
conception of the First Amendment, and, as a result, provided Congress with an unnec-
essary and potentially dangerous power to interfere with the emerging modem networks
of telecommunication.
' John Milton, Areopagitica, in Stephen Orgel and Jonathan Goldberg, eds, John
Milton 236, 263 (Oxford 1991). Milton opposed licensing laws because they would frus-
trate this search. Id at 263-64 ("Suffer not these licensing prohibitions to stand at every
place of opportunity forbidding and disturbing them that continue seeking, that continue
to do our obsequies to the torn body of [Truth,] our martyred saint.").
' Id at 240 (He "who kills a man kills a reasonable creature, God's image; but he
who destroys a good book kills... the image of God, as it were, in the eye.").
See Stanley Fish, Unger and Milton, 1988 Duke L J 975, 979 ("[D]espite surface
similarities, Milton's program is finally the antithesis of [ ] liberalism."). Ultimately, all
theories that understand the First Amendment as an instrument to the collective good
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that those forms of speech not useful in reaching his goal should
be suppressed," and that once the goal of divine truth was
reached, the liberty could be discarded altogether." As we will
see, the self-governance theory of free speech, which like Milton's
is only instrumental, affords a similarly contingent liberty.39
Relatively forgotten today, as compared with Milton's theo-
ries, are ideas from late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
England that foreshadow a property-centered theory of the First
Amendment. This is somewhat surprising, since property rights
were at the center of the emerging Whig theory of government in
England during that period, and it was the Whig paradigm that
dramatically influenced the framing of the Constitution."
The seeds of a property-centered First Amendment were
blown across the Atlantic in three separate vessels. First, the two
English episodes that were most renowned in the colonies as
victories for freedom of the press-the termination of licensing
laws and the denial of government power to seize written materi-
als under general warrant-were both justified on property-
rights grounds.4 ' Second, the essays on the theory of govern-
ment most widely read in the colonies saw liberty and property
rights as essentially indivisible.42 Finally, the most sophisticated
lead to censorship because there is no reason to believe that the actual distribution of
information resulting from complete freedom of transmission will lead to a predefined
notion of the good.
' Thus, Milton did not wish to extend tolerance to Roman Catholics because their
writings would not be useful in the search for truth. See Fredrick Seaton Siebert, Freedom
of the Press in England 1476-1776 197 (fllinois 1952).
' The freedom of inquiry contemplated by Milton will only last until "we come to be-
atific vision [of the entire divine Truth of the world]." Milton, Areopagitica at 263 (cited in
note 34). See also Fish, 1988 Duke L J at 979 (cited in note 36):
Milton, however, counsels not the managing of difference but its multiplication; and
his aim is not to protect difference, in the sacred name of individual rights, but final-
ly to eliminate it. That is why his insistence that we not pitch our tents here, on the
campgrounds of any orthodoxy, is qualified by a future hope: "till we come to beatific
vision." Beatific vision names that state when all visions will be one and indistin-
guishable from the vision of deity. Difference then is only a temporary and regretta-
ble condition, but one, paradoxically, that we must take advantage of if we are to
transcend it.
' For a discussion of the manner in which self-governance theories of the First
Amendment are being used to favor regulation of speech, see notes 288-96 and accom-
panying text.
" Professor William Mayton is a notable exception to the usual failure to emphasize
the role of the Whig printers. See William T. Mayton, The Illegitimacy of the Public Inter-
est Standard at the FCC, 38 Emory L J 715, 720-27 (1989).
' See notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
4 See notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
The University of Chicago Law Review
philosophical defense of the Whig theory of government and the pri-
macy of property rights, namely John Locke's Second Treatise on
Government," provided direct theoretical inspiration to James
Madison-the drafter of the First Amendment." Indeed, the
echoes of the Second Treatise in Madison's most extensive dis-
cussion of the philosophical wellsprings of the First Amendment
make it obvious that he adapted Lockean principles to defend
freedom of speech on the grounds that it was an aspect of the
individual's property right in his information.45
A. The Role of Property Notions in the Struggle for a Free Press
in England
It should not be surprising that printers played the most
prominent role in attacking restrictions on freedom of the press
in England and that they relied on arguments drawn from prop-
erty rights to do so. Printers faced loss of income when the gov-
ernment suppressed the publication of materials they purchased
from authors. Printers, as part of the rising middle class, natu-
rally sought to defend their interests and limit the prerogatives
of the government. Finally, printers were in a good position to
exert political influence over parliament and the judiciary be-
cause they owned many of the newspapers of the day.46 Printers
were in fact intimately involved in the two most important blows
struck for a free press in England-the demise of the licensing
system, and the termination of general warrants by which the
government seized printed material.47 The notion of information
as property came naturally to printers and played a prominent
part in their arguments for freedom-arguments that, unlike
John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Laslett 2d ed 1967) 285.
For a discussion of Locke's influence on Madison, see text accompanying notes 68-
92.
4 See James Madison, Property, Natl Gazette (Mar 27, 1792), reprinted in Robert A.
Rutland, et al, eds, 14 The Papers of James Madison 266-68 (Virginia 1983). While both
the English Whigs and Madison defended free speech on essentially liberal grounds, and
thus rooted the concept of freedom of speech in property rights, I do not argue that they
fully comprehended the libertarian consequences of the structure of their arguments. The
arguments may have been deployed for limited purposes, such as eliminating licensing
laws, see Leonard W. Levy, Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech and Press in Early
American History 185 (Belknap 1960) (arguing that concept of free speech at the time of
the Framing contemplated only limits on prior restraints), but it is the structure of their
conception that is relevant to current debates.
46 See Siebert, Freedom of the Press at 8 (cited in note 37).
47 Id.
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Milton's, actually succeeded in curtailing the government's power
to regulate expression.
In 1693 printers made their winning argument against the
licensing system." The system, originated by Henry VIII, re-
quired that books bear the imprimatur of a licenser in London
before they could be printed.49 As such, it was a classic example
of "centralized, bureaucratic control."" The Whig printers' at-
tack on the law was grounded in theories of individual economic
rights and consumer welfare, as opposed to the theological argu-
ments of Milton. In their successful petition to the House of
Lords, they argued against a renewal of the licensing system on
the grounds that it "subjects all Learning and true Information to
the arbitrary Will and Pleasure of a mercenary, and perhaps
ignorant, Licenser; destroys the Properties of Authors in their
Copies; and sets up many Monopolies."51 These are exactly the
same kinds of arguments that were deployed by those defending
rights in material property against centralized bureaucratic con-
trol.5
2
Seventy years later the printers played an important role in
another confrontation concerning the freedom of the press-this
time over the government's power to use general warrants to
seize books and papers in order to prosecute seditious libel ac-
tions.53 The printers funded the litigation of John Wilkes, a
prominent opposition member of the House of Commons, and his
associates, in which they contested the government's power to
search their houses for papers that they had used in producing
newspapers critical of the government.54 At the time, these suits
were widely understood to be part of the ongoing crusade for
greater freedom for the press.55 Indeed, colonial Americans re-
membered this set of cases as one of the great turning points in
Actual victory came in 1694, when the House of Commons failed to renew the
Licensing Act. See Sir William Holdsworth, 6 A History of English Law 375 (Methuen 2d
ed 1937).
" Mayton, 38 Emory L J at 721 (cited in note 40).
Id.
51 15 HL Jour 280 (Mar 8, 1692).
52 See, for example, Adam Smith, 1 An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations 165 (Chicago 1976) (Edwin Cannan, ed).
' The Supreme Court has recognized that the history of the struggle over the use of
general warrants "is largely a history of conflict between the Crown and the press." Stan-
ford v Texas, 379 US 476, 482 (1965).
' See Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in
Eighteenth Century England, 75 Cornell L Rev 497, 585 (1990) (discussing role of printers
in litigation).
5 Id at 584.
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the struggle for that freedom." Wilkes and Judge Charles Pratt
Camden, who in Entick v Carrington57 handed down the most
celebrated of the opinions rebuking the government, became
heroes of liberty throughout the colonies.5 8
Property notions were again crucial to the printers' victory.
In Entick, Judge Camden began his discussion of the legality of
the government's searches by reiterating the basic axiom of the
Whig theory of government:
The great end, for which men entered into society, was to
secure their property. That right is preserved sacred and
incommunicable in all instances, where it has not been tak-
en away or abridged by some public law for the good of the
whole. 9
Judge Camden then deployed this contemporary theory of gov-
ernment to overturn the old practices of the Star Chamber as
well as the common law opinion of the former Chief Judge
Scroggs, which had previously permitted the seizure of written
material under a general warrant. ° Judge Camden reasoned
that while the government could seize stolen goods under a gen-
eral warrant, it could not search and seize the printed materials
of Wilkes's printer associate because the printer had superior
title to them:
Papers are the owner's goods and chattels: they are his dear-
est property; and are so far from enduring a seizure, that
they will hardly bear an inspection; and though the eye
cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass, yet
where private papers are removed and carried away, the
secret nature of those goods will be an aggravation of the
trespass, and demand more considerable damages in that re-
spect.6
See Siebert, Freedom of the Press at 381 (cited in note 37) (observing that these
cases destroyed "the last of the arbitrary powers of the executive derived from the Regula-
tion of Printing Acts").
5' 19 Howell St Trials 1029 (CP 1765).
's See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv L Rev 757,
772 n 54 (1994) (noting that "Wilkes and Liberty' became a rallying cry for all those who
hated government oppression" and that "Americans across the continent named cities,
counties, and even children in honor of Wilkes and the libertarian judge, Lord Camden").
19 Howell St Trials at 1066.
6o See Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 Va L Rev
869, 875-84 (1985) (describing English precedent).
61 Entick, 19 Howell St Trials at 1066. For a discussion of the importance of property
concepts to the Entick holding, see Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Documents and the Privilege
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Judge Camden, locating the property right at issue in the
physical substance of the pages as opposed to the ideas them-
selves, was not quite as explicit about the relationship between
property and information as Madison would be twenty years
later. Nevertheless, despite his own sense of the inadequacy of
prior legal categories ("the eye cannot by the law of England be
guilty of trespass"), Judge Camden believed that the appropria-
tion of the physical matter did not capture the enormity of the
wrong in seizing printed material. He stated that damages for
the trespass should be increased because disclosure of the infor-
mation at a time when its owners wished to keep it secret was an
injury distinct from the seizure of the physical papers, thus hint-
ing that an individual had a property right in information that
he produced as well as in tangible things. In any event, it is clear
that the decision in Entick was premised on Camden's under-
standing of Whig political theory and protection for property that
flowed from that theory.
Thus, in two of the most celebrated victories for freedom of
the press at the time of the Framing, property notions were inti-
mately connected to the evolution of this new liberty. These fa-
mous historical incidents, however, were not the only factors
linking the emerging categories of free speech and press with
property rights. The Whig tradition was not only the intellectual
framework for diminishing government censorship in England,
but also the foundation of American political philosophy at the
time of the Framing.62 In the Whig tradition, freedom of speech
and property rights were seen simply as different aspects of an
indivisible concept of liberty. For instance, Trenchard and
Gordon, the authors of Cato's letters,63 equated property and lib-
erty:
By Liberty, I understand the Power which every Man has
over his own Actions, and his Right to enjoy the Fruits of his
Labour, Art, and Industry, as far as by it he hurts not the
Society, or any Members of it, by taking from any Member,
or by hindering him from enjoying what he himself en-
joys.4
Against Self-Incrimination, 48 U Pitt L Rev 27, 34 (1986).
' See Laura S. Underkufflier, On Property: An Essay, 100 Yale L J 127, 137-38
(1990).
' Cato's letters have been described as "the most popular, quotable, esteemed source
of political ideas in the colonial period." Clinton Rossiter, Seedtime of the Republic 141
(Harcourt, Brace 1953).
' An Enquiry into the Nature and Extent of Liberty; with its Loveliness and Advan-
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Therefore it is not surprising that even those of the founding
generation who did not base their theory of free speech directly
on Locke, as Madison would, nevertheless accepted the basic
Whig equation of property and what we would currently term
civil liberties.65 For instance, Joseph Story believed that man
has property "in things [and] in actions."66 Thus, since at the
time of the Framing it was widely agreed that men's liberty and
property rights were one and the same, the right of free speech
could be understood as intimately connected to the natural right
of property, in the capacious sense in which that concept was
then conceived.'
B. Madison's Adaptation of Lockean Theory as Justification for
the First Amendment
None of the Framers had as sophisticated an understanding
of the relation of free speech to property as James Madison. It
was Madison who deployed John Locke's theory of property as
the touchstone for his conceptualization of the First Amendment.
Although many commentators have invoked Madison to support
the notion that free speech should be understood principally as
an instrument to a collective good, such as promoting delibera-
tion in a democracy,68 Madison himself understood freedom of
tages, and the vile Effects of Slavery, in J. Trenchard and T. Gordon, 2 Cato's Letters; or
Essays on Liberty, Civil and Religious, And other important Subjects 244, 244-45 (Wilkins
3d ed 1733).
' Gordon and Trenchard further suggested that "the Security of Property, and the
Freedom of Speech, always go together...." Of Freedom of Speech: That the same is
inseparable from Publick Liberty, in J. Trenchard and T. Gordon, 1 Cato's Letters; or
Essays on Liberty, Civil and Religious, And other important Subjects 96, 96 (Wilkins 3d ed
1733). For further discussion of the influence of Cato's letters, see Jonathan W. Emord,
The First Amendment Invalidity of FCC Ownership Regulations, 38 Cath U L Rev 401,
452 (1989).
See, for example, Joseph Story, Natural Law, in James McClellan, Joseph Story
and the American Constitution: A Study in Political and Legal Thought 313, 321 (Oklaho-
ma 1971). See also John 0. McGinnis, The Partial Republican, 35 Wm & Mary L Rev
1751, 1763-65 (1994), reviewing Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Harvard
1993) (noting similarity in Federalist and Antifederalist conceptions of natural rights,
including property rights).
' Thus, contrary to those who assert that "the very notion of free speech for citizens
had grown out of an older tradition establishing legislative 'speech and debate' immunity
from prosecution," see, for example, Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitu-
tion, 100 Yale L J 1131, 1151 (1991), the celebrated events and writings discussed here
suggest that the concepts of freedom of speech and freedom of press can instead be traced
back to an individual-property-rights tradition that emerged in seventeenth- and eigh-
teenth-century England.
' See, for example, Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech at xvi-xx,
241-52 (cited in note 28). None of these theorists ever confronts Madison's discussion of
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speech as a type of property right inhering in individuals. In an
essay on the nature of property and its relation to the individual
rights contained in the First Amendment, he declared that every
individual has "property in his opinions and the free communica-
tion of them."69 Indeed, a careful examination of this essay, the
most extended Madison ever wrote on property, shows not only
his deep indebtedness to Locke, but also his ability to extrapolate
from Locke to create a more subtle defense of freedom of speech
than Locke himself ever provided."0 Madison stated:
[Property] in its particular application means "that dominion
which one man claims and exercises over the external things
of the world, in exclusion of every other individual."
In its larger and juster meaning, it embraces every
thing to which a man may attach a value and have a right;
and which leaves to every one else the like advantage.
In the former sense, a man's land, or merchandize, or
money is called his property.
In the latter sense, a man has a property in his opinions
and the free communication of them.
He has a property of peculiar value in his religious opin-
ions, and in the profession and practice dictated by them.
He has a property very dear to him in the safety and
liberty of his person.
He has an equal property in the free use of his faculties
and free choice of the objects on which to employ them.
In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his prop-
erty, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights.
Government is instituted to protect property of every
sort; as well that which lies in the various rights of individu-
property and the First Amendment. For discussion of their theories, see notes 290-96 and
accompanying text.
" Madison, Property at 266 (cited in note 45). It is clear that in this passage Madison
is ruminating on the relation of property and some of the rights contained in the First
Amendment. He discusses not only a man's "property in his opinions and the free commu-
nication of them"-free speech, but also man's property in his "religious opinions, and in
the profession and practice dictated by them"-free exercise. Id.
As far as I can tell, however, no one else has ever quoted this essay in a law review
article about the First Amendment. The neglect of this essay is dramatic evidence of the
dominance of the two competing First Amendment theories: the idea of the First Amend-
ment as an instrument of collective democratic good, and the idea of the First Amendment
as self-expression. For further discussion of these competing theories, see Part IV.
"' Locke did not explicitly include any provision for free press or free speech in his
scheme of government. See Siebert, Freedom of the Press at 6 (cited in note 37).
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als, as that which the term particularly expresses. This
being the end of government, that alone is a just govern-
ment, which impartially secures to every man, whatever is
his own.7
This discussion shows Madison's embrace of Lockean theory
in three separate respects. First, Madison's view that man has a
property "in the safety and liberty of his person" echoes Locke's
declaration that "every Man has a Property in his own Person."72
Moreover, Locke went on to state that "The Labour of his Body,
and the Work of his Hands... are properly his."73 It was a
short, but still insightful step for Madison to embrace the propo-
sition that man had a property right in the ideas his person pro-
duced; that is, that he had a property right in his opinions.74
Indeed, Madison's inference suggests that he had a deep appreci-
ation of Locke's theory of property and its relation to Locke's
theory of human autonomy. The latter theory held that an indi-
vidual owns property by applying his labor to matter75 and thus
infusing his spirit into nature.7" If an individual may own mate-
rial property by applying his labor, then, a fortiori, in Madison's
view, the ideas and information each individual produces can be
understood as property." It is important to note that the
2 Madison, Property at 266 (cited in note 45).
Locke, Two Treatises at 305 (cited in note 43).
Id at 305-06.
74 The use of the word "opinions" suggests that Madison employed a broad conception
of First Amendment freedoms. Opinions can be used to mean not only analyses and
descriptions of data but also descriptions of one's emotional state and probable course of
conduct. The breadth of Madison's concept of "opinions" is also suggested by Madison's
use of the word to encompass religious beliefs. In addition, his discussion of "religious
opinions" as a kind of property suggests that Madison saw a close connection between the
Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses.
"5 Even formulating relatively commonplace statements demands some expenditure
of energy; our brains must fire hundreds of thousands of neurons. See Pinker, Language
Instinct at 317-22 (cited in note 23).
"' See Andrzej Rapaczynski, Nature and Politics: Liberalism in the Philosophies of
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau 189 (Cornell 1987). Madison captures this connection be-
tween autonomy and property by stating that "as a man is said to have a right to his
property, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights." Madison, Property at
266 (cited in note 45).
7 One caveat is that one has a right to information only insofar as it was not ac-
quired in violation of the property rights of others. This caveat is implicit in the proviso
that one has a property right only so long as one's appropriation "leaves to every one else
the like advantage." Madison, Property at 266 (cited in note 45). Stealing someone else's
property hardly leaves him the "like advantage." The First Amendment thus does not give
a right, for instance, to photocopy books of others, even if such action will disseminate
one's own views. For discussion of the relation between copyright and the First
Amendment under a property-based theory, see Part II.B.
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breadth of the Madisonian/Lockean conception of ownership per-
mits dominion over a wide range of information produced by an individu-
al,7 including not only ideas in the sense of explanations, de-
scriptions, or claims about the moral or material world, but also
commitments to others such as offers and promises.79
Madison understood that free speech is a property right
because property in its broadest sense "embraces every thing to
which a man may attach a value and have a right; and which
leaves to every one else the like advantage.""0 The latter phrase
replicates Locke's famous proviso that there is a natural right to
acquire property "at least where there is enough, and as good left
in common for others.""' Whether this proviso is satisfied when
an individual takes dominion over material items such as land or
other natural resources is often a complicated question. Because
there is a limited material supply, one person's use may preclude
another's.82 It is not surprising that Madison found it relatively
self-evident that a person's right to produce ideas and transmit
them to whomever he wishes satisfied this proviso. There does
not seem to be a limited supply of ideas, and one person's produc-
tion and transmission of ideas does not deny those opportunities
to others."
" The most comprehensive defense of understanding all information as property is
contained in Lysander Spooner, The Law of Intellectual Property 1, 17-21 reprinted in 3
The Collected Works of Lysander Spooner (M & S 1971). Spooner brilliantly defends this
view against various objections, such as the arguments that ideas cannot be identified and
thus cannot be property, id at 57-59, and that ideas cannot belong to two people simulta-
neously, id at 68-69.
" The breadth of the information production protected by Lockean theory is impor-
tant for two reasons. First, it helps explain why the Constitution affords special protection
to property rights in information as opposed to material production: commitments and
promises are particularly dangerous to rulers. See text accompanying notes 104-09.
Second, it ensures that the Lockean theory comports with the broad role that information
transmission has played in the evolution of the human species: our information transmis-
sion and reception abilities have arisen both to explain the world and to facilitate mutual-
ly useful relations of all kinds among members of our species. See generally McGinnis,
Information Transmission (cited in note 23), for discussion of these two functions of in-
formation transmission in the evolution of human nature.
Madison, Property at 266 (cited in note 45).
81 Locke, Two Treatises at 306 (cited in note 43).
2 For an attempt to sort out these complicated issues, see Robert Nozick, Anarchy,
State, and Utopia 174-82 (Basic Books 1974). I discuss them briefly in note 256.
' Distinguished commentators have followed this common-sense understanding that
creating intellectual property always satisfies the Lockean proviso. See, for example, John
Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy 233 (Longmans, Green 1872). Recently,
Professor Gordon challenged this claim, suggesting that creating intellectual property and
retaining exclusive rights to it may not satisfy the Lockean proviso under certain con-
ditions. See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individu-
alism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L J 1533, 1566-70 (1993).
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In this passage, Madison also emphatically reiterates Locke's
understanding of the purpose of government. Locke asserted that
the preservation of property is the "great and chief end [ ] of
Men's uniting into Commonwealths."' Similarly, Madison states
that "[glovernment is instituted to protect property of every sort,"
including, in Madison's view, man's property in his "opinions and
the free communication of them." 5 Thus, according to the first
principles of the father of the Bill of Rights, free speech is not
simply or even principally a means for sustaining a particular
form of government; to the contrary, protecting free speech and
other property rights is the end for which government is consti-
tuted.6
Although Madison's discussion of the First Amendment is
not very detailed, it also makes the key connection between prop-
erty in information and the right to transmit information, noting
the individual's property interest in the "free communication" of
his opinions.8 If the government suppressed the means of trans-
mitting information, the individual could not exercise his right of
"free communication" and his possession of "opinions" therefore
would be less valuable to him. A way of further understanding
Madison's insight is to continue his analogy of information to
material property. If an individual's rights with respect to his
material property were limited to possession, and did not include
the right of use and the right of exchange, such property would
be far less valuable to him. The right to use material property
allows the possessor to enjoy its fruits or income; the right to ex-
change such property allows not only the possessor but also those
who buy his property *to enjoy gains from trade. 8 Hence the
rights of use and disposition are important wealth-maximizing
aspects of an individual's ownership of material property, as well
However, Professor Gordon does not recognize that the First Amendment itself is a
reflection of the Lockean natural rights theory of property. Rather, she contrasts natural
rights in intellectual property with First Amendment values. Id at 1536-37. For a discus-
sion of why the underlying theory of the First Amendment is generally consistent with
that of copyright, see Part II.B.
Locke, Two Treatises at 368 (cited in note 43).
Madison, Property at 266 (cited in note 45).
See Federalist 10 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 77, 78
(Mentor 1961) ("The protection of these faculties [the different and unequal faculties for
acquiring property] is the first object of government.").
Madison, Property at 266 (cited in note 45).
Richard A. Epstein, Property and Necessity, 13 Harv J L & Pub Policy 2, 3-4 (1990).
Gains from trade result from the legal right of the possessor to sell his property to a user
who values the property more highly than does the possessor. Id.
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as the essential reason that property rights result in increased
wealth for society as a whole.
Similarly, the rights to communicate ideas and information
free from interference (what this Article calls transmission
rights) increase the value of information to the individual in
possession of it. 9 By exercising his right to transmit information
to others, the individual may gain the receipt of money, return
information, or increased respect in his community of information
receivers." In this Article, I shall refer to the gains from free-
dom to transmit as the "use value" of information. I thus distin-
guish it from what I define as the "retention value" of informa-
tion that comes from the intellectual property rights, such as
copyright, that allow information producers in some cases to
alienate information to one person while retaining the exclusive
right to alienate it to another.9 Because, for reasons discussed
below, the government poses a substantial threat to an
individual's exploitation of the use value of his information,92
Madison was correct to understand the First Amendment as a
right of "free communication" that allowed an individual to real-
ize value in information beyond the value he enjoyed by simply
possessing it.
' For discussion of the importance of social exchange of information, see text accom-
panying notes 141-46.
' Under the Madisonian/Lockean view, recipients of information do not have First
Amendment rights because they have not labored to create or transmit the information.
Thus, in this theory, the part of First Amendment jurisprudence that is built on the right
to receive information has no secure foundations. The classic statement of that faulty
jurisprudence is found in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v FCC, 395 US 367, 390 (1969) ("It is
the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is para-
mount."). That opinion invokes the self-governance rationale of the First Amendment to
support the right of citizens to information. Id. For other criticism of Red Lion and subse-
quent decisions, see notes 265-68 and accompanying text.
") Thus, in my terminology, "use value" of information includes the value that an
individual obtains from one-shot sales of information, as well as from social exchange for
return information or status. For a discussion of the relationship between copyright (the
regime for protecting retention value), and the First Amendment (the regime for protect-
ing use value), see Part II.B. In addition, there is another kind of value of information, be-
sides use value and retention value-I call this "possession value." Possession value is the
value produced by the noncommunicative beneficial actions that an individual can take on
the basis of his own information.
For reasons discussed below, see text accompanying notes 141-46, I think this is a
useful way to distinguish types of information. Individuals have had use value in informa-
tion since at least the time our ancestors formulated sentences. Retention value, on the
other hand, requires at least some rudimentary mechanisms of contract; the maximization
of such value requires mechanisms such as copyright that have been developed only since
the Renaissance.
' See text accompanying notes 102-12.
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Madison's argument for the First Amendment is thus rooted
in Locke's theory of natural property rights. From some of his
other writings, we know that Madison saw another important
similarity between free speech and rights in material property:
he believed that the social welfare gains from protecting natural
rights in information transmission were similar to those gains
from protecting natural rights in material property. Like Adam
Smith, Madison and other Framers believed that rights in
material goods create prosperity and, indeed, ensure the progress
of civilized society.93  Analogously, Madison believed that
property rights in opinions (called the freedom of speech) lead to
the discovery of truth, as false ideas are refuted and replaced. 4
For instance, Madison suggests that it is "to the press alone,
chequered as it is with abuses, the world is indebted for all the
triumphs which have been gained by reason and humanity over
error and oppression."95 For Madison, the exercise of the free-
dom of speech has the same consequences as the exercise of other
property rights, in that it helps sustain a beneficial, decentralized
civil order outside the control of the state.96
We should not be surprised that Madison emphasizes that
the exercise of natural rights of information transmission has
beneficial consequences. Like all great liberal theorists, Madison
was a compatibilist in his deployment of deontological and
consequentialist theories.97 Because of the human capacity for
self-delusion and error, almost all political arguments, even when
"3 See, for example, James Madison, Note to His Speech on the Right of Suffrage, in
Department of State, Documentary History of the Constitution of the United States of
America 1786-1870 Appendix at 440, 441 (1905) ("In civilized communities, property... is
an essential object of the laws, which encourage[s] industry by securing the enjoyment of
its fruits."); Gouverneur Morris, Political Enquiries, 1776: An Essay by Gouverneur Mor-
ris, in Willi Paul Adams, "The Spirit of Commerce Requires that Property Be Secured":
Gouverneur Morris and the American Revolution, 21 Amerikastudien 327, 331 (1976)
("The most rapid advances in the State of Society are produced by Com-
merce .... [Commerce] requires not only the perfect Security of Property but perfect good
faith .... It requires also that every Citizen have the Right freely to use his Property.").
9" See, for example, James Madison, Address of the General Assembly to the People of
the Commonwealth of Virginia, in Gaillard Hunt, ed, 6 The Writings of James Madison
332, 337 (Putnam 1906) ("By subjecting the truth of opinion to [ I regulation, fine, and
imprisonment, to be inflicted by those who are of a different opinion, the free range of the
human mind is injuriously restrained.").
"5 James Madison, Report on the Resolutions, in Gaillard Hunt, ed, 6 The Writings of
James Madison 341, 389 (Putnam 1906).
"6 As I argue in Part III, computer nets facilitate that decentralized civil order today.
"' See Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Of Chickens and Eggs-The Compatibility of
Moral Rights and Consequentialist Analyses, 12 Harv J L & Pub Policy 611, 619-20 (1989)
(discussing classical liberal political theorists' compatibilism).
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they are rooted in natural rights, also appeal to the social ben-
efits of rights. 8 The convergence of natural rights intuition and
a rough utilitarian calculus strengthens our confidence in the re-
sults reached by our political and moral theory.9
Nevertheless, the starting points of a jurisprudence often
dramatically affect its course of development. As we shall see, a
natural rights jurisprudence of free speech will, over time, look
very different from a jurisprudence that starts with the under-
standing that free speech is an instrument to a collective good,
because the instrumental view is inclined to revise liberties as
circumstances change.' Moreover, the social benefit Madison
discovers in the exercise of speech rights is much broader than
Meiklejohn's goal of collective self-governance. To see increased
knowledge as the end of free speech is to embrace an extremely
broad and diffuse goal. Characteristically for an Enlightenment
thinker, the goal of increasing human knowledge is all-encom-
passing: nothing human is alien to it.'
II. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE FIRST AMENDMENT"
In light of Madison's understanding of the nature of free
speech, how shall we reorient our understanding of the First
Amendment in the constitutional order? If we regard the First
Amendment as prohibiting government interference with the
individual's right to transmit information and realize its use val-
ue, we need to inquire into the fit between the First Amendment
and other constitutional provisions that relate to property rights
in material goods and in information. For instance, why did the
Constitution provide, through the First Amendment, far more
stringent protections for the use value of information than it
provided, through the Fifth Amendment, for the bundle of rights
that attach to material property? How is a property-centered
Id at 615-16.
- Id.
'oo For discussion of these differences, see text accompanying notes 290-96.
101 Neither the self-governance theory nor the self-expression theory of the First
Amendment justify a scope of free inquiry as broad as the property-based theory. Many
matters interesting and important to individuals are not amenable to redress by govern-
ment, and thus fall outside the self-governance rationale. See Oliver Goldsmith, The
Traveller, reprinted in Arthur Friedman, ed, 4 Collected Works of Oliver Goldsmith 248,
269 (Clarendon 1966) ("How small, of all that human hearts endure, / That part which
laws or kings can cause or cure."). Moreover, the market is itself an indispensable way of
discovering the wants and needs of other individuals, but the self-expression theory
conventionally excepts market information from its ambit. See text accompanying notes
322-27.
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view of the First Amendment consistent with the Copyright
Clause, which provides Congress with an independent power to
protect what I have defined as the retention value of informa-
tion? The answers to these questions, developed in Parts A and B
below, actually confirm the coherence of the property-based view
of the First Amendment and its consonance with the rest of the
Constitution.
Once it is understood that the property-centered vision is
coherent and consistent with the original animating principles of
the Constitution, there remains the question of what it would
mean in practice. What might a property-centered First Amend-
ment jurisprudence look like? Given that the press and analogous
mass media use all sorts of privately owned material property to
transmit information, how would a property-based jurisprudence
protect such property against burdensome government regula-
tion? Part C attempts to sketch the contours of a First Amend-
ment jurisprudence that protects the individual's use value of his
information.
A. The Constitution's Special Protection for the Use Value of
Information
The Constitution affords more substantial protection to free
speech rights than to most other rights related to material prop-
erty. However, differing standards of protection for different
rights are not inconsistent with understanding free speech as
rooted in protecting an individual's use value in his information.
Republican theory at the time of the Framing was realistic
enough to understand that no structure of government could
protect all natural rights perfectly, because any branch of govern-
ment with sufficient unity and power to achieve perfect enforce-
ment would in the end degenerate into tyranny. °2 Since com-
plete and perfect enforcement was not possible, it was rational to
provide special protection for those rights most threatened by
rulers.
'o For a fuller discussion of the Framers' realism about the ability of the state to pro-
tect all natural rights, see McGinnis, 35 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1773-81 (cited in note 66).
One criticism, therefore, of a libertarian regime like the one Richard Epstein envisions is
that mandating judicial protection for all natural rights invests excessive power in a
single government institution. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the
Power of Eminent Domain (Harvard 1985) (suggesting that the judiciary protect a wide
range of economic liberties).
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The right to transmit information, either unassisted or
through the use of material property-the rights of free speech
and free press, respectively-is an obvious candidate for a natu-
ral right that requires special protection.0 3 Unlike the exercise
of other property rights, the right to publish ideas and transmit
promises and commitments to others can directly and immediate-
ly threaten the positions of the rulers of society, particularly in a
republican system where the rulers' positions are dependent on
the opinions of the ruled. 1' Indeed, what distinguishes all the
13 Some have argued that the Framers' failure to apply the First Amendment to the
states suggests that the Amendment was not intended to protect individual rights, but
rather a right of the majority to control the federal government. See, for example, Amar,
100 Yale L J at 1147-48 (cited in note 67). I find this inference unwarranted. Madison, in
fact, proposed that the First Amendment be applied to the states, see James Madison,
Statement in Congress, in Bernard Schwartz, 5 The Roots of The Bill of Rights 1023, 1027
(Chelsea House 1980) ("No State shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the free-
dom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases."), but the final version applied
only to the federal government. The object of protecting transmission rights against
interference by state governments, however, could be accomplished as effectively by state
constitutions as by the federal constitution, and many state constitutions at the time of
the Framing protected the freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, or both. See, for
example, Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), reprinted in Bernard Schwartz, 2 The
Roots of The Bill of Rights 234, 235 (Chelsea House 1980) ("[F]reedom of the Press is one
of the greatest bulwarks of liberty."). Imposing a federal restriction on the states thus
may have seemed relatively unimportant. For a fuller discussion of state constitutional
protections of free speech and free press at the time of the Framing, see Jonathan W.
Emord, Freedom, Technology, and the First Amendment 68-70 (Pacific Research Institute
for Public Policy 1991).
Moreover, political theory at the time of the Framing was concerned with preventing
the federal government from becoming powerful enough to degenerate into tyranny.
Theorists thus sought to maximize the long-run protection for natural rights. See
McGinnis, 35 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1762-63 (cited in note 66). The states were one of the
principal restraints on the federal government. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:
Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U Chi L Rev 1484, 1504-05 (1987), reviewing Raoul
Berger, Federalism: The Founders' Design (Oklahoma 1987) (One of the principal purposes
of federalism was to diffuse power in the interest of constraining the federal government.).
Thus, the Framers had an affirmative reason based in their political theory to conclude
that the loss of state autonomy occasioned by giving additional powers to the federal
judiciary outweighed the benefits of providing citizens additional rights against the
states-particularly when the states were showing every sign of granting them anyway.
Another difficulty with Professor Amar's inference is that the Bill of Rights contains
other provisions, such as the Takings Clause, that are intended to protect natural rights,
and again applies these provisions only to the federal government.
04 For the same reason that information transmission rights are feared by rulers,
they are particularly useful to citizens. See, for example, Madison, Report on the Resolu-
tions at 397 (cited in note 95) ("The... efficacy of this right (of electing representatives]
depends on the knowledge of the comparative merits and demerits of the candidates for
public trust, and on the equal freedom, consequently, of examining and discussing these
merits and demerits of the candidates respectively."). These rights allow citizens to
discover through discussion whether there exists a critical mass of opposition to the
rulers' decisions and then to develop majorities to restrain a self-interested legislature
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individual rights mentioned in the First Amendment-free
speech, free press, free exercise of religion, and free assem-
bly-from many of the others mentioned in the Bill of Rights is
that the exercise of First Amendment rights poses an imminent
danger to those in control of the government.' The history
known to the Framers revealed that a speech against the gover-
nor, a newspaper article exposing corruption, an impromptu
assembly of those with festering grievances, or a religious cru-
sade all could oust a set of rulers much faster than the accumula-
tion of material wealth.' Thus, even if the Framers believed
that individuals' rights in their information were neither more
natural to man nor more beneficial to society than rights relating
to material property, they could still have rationally bestowed
more protection on information transmission rights precisely
because such rights are more likely to be suppressed by those
seeking to maintain political power.' 7
and executive. Thus Professor Amar is right to see the First Amendment as facilitating
majoritarian control. See Amar, 100 Yale L J at 1147 (cited in note 67). It does not, how-
ever, necessarily follow that because the First Amendment has these consequences, free
speech is protected to promote majority rule rather than on account of its status as a nat-
ural right. Nor is there any fundamental dichotomy, as Professor Amar seems to imply,
between viewing free speech as a right of majoritarian control or of minority opposition.
Id. Majorities do not come ready-made: transmission rights are necessary for citizens to
discover that they are in a majority on an issue and, if they are not, to form a coalition
with other groups on a range of issues so they can forge a majority. Moreover, because
public opinion changes, today's minority may be tomorrows majority. Transmission rights
for minorities thus enable smoother transitions to new majorities: they provide an ad-
vance warning system of democratic change. Republican theory at the time of the Fram-
ing was intensely concerned with political stability, see McGinnis, 35 Wm & Mary L Rev
at 1774-77 (cited in note 66), and the Framers' concern with minority rights as well as
majority rights can be understood in that context.
1"5 One material good that could immediately threaten government was armaments.
Thus, it is wholly consistent with the theory of the First Amendment offered here that the
Constitution, through the Second Amendment, gave special protection to citizens' right to
possess arms. See Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right
to Self-Preservation, 39 Ala L Rev 103, 113-21 (1987) (discussing the analogy between the
First and Second Amendments).
If government poses a greater threat to free speech than to most material property,
it is possible to agree with Ronald Coase that economic freedoms are as important as
freedom of speech, see R.H. Coase, The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 Am
Econ Rev 384, 385-86 (1974), but still conclude that in a world where it is impossible to
protect all rights perfectly, the judiciary should give particular protection to speech rights.
106 For a discussion of the manner in which the dispersion of ideas overthrows govern-
ments, see Robert Darnton, The Forbidden Best-Sellers of Pre-Revolutionary France 169-
97 (Norton 1995) (suggesting that literature could facilitate opposition to a regime by
crystallizing subversive attitudes forming in different sectors of society).
" Given the heavy government regulation of material property rights since the New
Deal, it may be open to doubt whether the state now poses a greater threat to the rights
of information transmission than to the rights of material production. The Framers may
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Although the primary reason for providing special protection
for the use value of information lies in our suspicion of rulers,
the text of the First Amendment does not distinguish between
political speech and other forms of speech. Even if the rulers
were a threat to only political speech, though, the constitutional
design would not be endangered by protecting a broader range of
information: the point of Locke's and Madison's scheme of gov-
ernment was to protect as much property as possible.' In any
event, the rationale for protecting information transmission can-
not easily be limited to the transmission of overtly political infor-
mation. First, it is difficult to fashion a distinction between
speech that may be threatening to rulers and speech that is
not. 9 Second, pure political speech often has to be mixed with
have mistakenly calculated the difference in the respective dangers. While they were all
too familiar with the suppression of speech by the British and other rulers, they did not
foresee the modern welfare state, with its pervasive rent seeking, which has become an
instrument for concentrated interest groups to expropriate the wealth of the less well
organized. For a discussion of this failure of foresight, see Frank H. Easterbrook, The
State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspective, 107 Harv L Rev 1328,
1333-39 (1994). Before confessing error for the Framers, though, we should remember that
our confidence that the state will not act against our information transmission rights is
largely a consequence of the First Amendment itself. The free speech principle is so
thoroughly intermixed with American culture that much information transmission would
long remain inviolable even if the First Amendment disappeared tomorrow.
ICS The creation and monitoring of protected and unprotected categories of information
would be costly. Thus, once it has been decided to provide constitutional protection to
information property, there is less reason to make refined subdivisions of the category.
Moreover, refusing to protect nonpolitical speech because we cannot find a specific ra-
tionale to justify the broad sweep of the language of the First Amendment misses the
point that the rationale of the Constitution as a whole was to give as much protection to
natural rights as possible. See text accompanying notes 84-86. Thus, I cannot agree with
Robert Bork's view that absent some special justification for protecting other kinds of
speech, only political speech was protected by the First Amendment. See Bork, 47 Ind L J
at 27 (cited in note 14). This view rests expressly on the premise that the Madisonian
system "assumes that in wide areas of life majorities are entitled to rule for no better
reason [than] that they are majorities." Id at 2. To the contrary, as we have seen, Madison
believed that the protection of natural rights, rather than the promotion of democracy,
was the end of government. Madison actually was quite concerned that "[tihere is no
maxim ... which is more liable to be misapplied,.., than the current one that the
interest of the majority is the political standard of right and wrong." See Letter from
James Madison to James Monroe (Oct 5, 1786), in Gaillard Hunt, ed, 2 The Writings of
James Madison 272, 273 (Putnam 1901).
'" Artistic speech, even of a very subtle kind, can be a threat to political regimes, as
the regimes themselves understand. For instance, Michael Chekhov, the great acting the-
orist, was prevented from directing plays in the Soviet Union because his actors were per-
forming in too spiritual a manner. See Mel Gordon, Introduction, in Michael Chekhov, On
the Technique of Acting xxi (HarperCollins 1991).
It is also hard to draw a bright line between commercial speech and political speech.
On the one hand, speakers often engage in indisputably political speech for profit, see
Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 Va L Rev 627,
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other forms of speech in order to appeal to a widespread audience
and thus create leverage against rulers. This is obviously true of
artistic speech; abstract political arguments often have to be
interwoven into stories before they resonate with the public.
Commercial speech in the form of advertisements is also often
necessary to support the publication of political speech,"' and
thus differential restrictions on commercial speech will affect the
ability to disseminate political speech."' Finally, because the
distinctions between political, artistic, and commercial speech are
quite subtle, the right to fashion these distinctions should be
denied the state. After all, the Framers rightly viewed the state
as the source of political suppression in the first place."
Accordingly, we should not be surprised that in three sepa-
rate respects the First Amendment has been more properly con-
strued to afford more protection for the use value of information
than the Takings Clause affords for material property."' First,
the First Amendment expressly prevents the government from
expropriating an individual's use value in his information, while
the Takings Clause allows the government to expropriate the use
637 (1990), and, on the other hand, indisputably commercial speech can have deep politi-
cal objectives. Consider, for instance, a journalist who abandons writing to enter the
telecommunications business, in part because he wants to promote a vision of a decentral-
ized, communication-rich society by assembling and advertising a communications net-
work.
"' Indeed, as a historical matter, the development of a free press and a commercial
press were inextricably linked at the time of the Framing. See Verner W. Crane, Introduc-
tion, in Verner W. Crane, ed, Benjamin Franklin's Letters to the Press 1758-1775 xvi
(North Carolina 1950) ("It was a commercial age, and produced a commercial press .. ").
. Restricting legal advertisements, for instance, may restrict speech about lawyers
and legal reform. A periodical would lose access to the class of advertisers that would
most wish to advertise in its magazine.
"' Compare Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 Suffolk U
L Rev 1, 10 (1986) ("[Tlhere is no clear demarcation between political speech and other
speech, once the purpose of protecting political speech is understood to be the preserva-
tion of political competition.").
11 These three respects can be defined by reference to the three concepts in the
Takings Clause underlined here: "[Nior shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." US Const, Amend V (emphasis added). First, the Takings
Clause permits the government to appropriate property if it provides just compensation.
The First Amendment does not permit the government to appropriate the use value of
information even with just compensation. See text accompanying notes 114-17. Second,
the Fifth Amendment, at least as currently interpreted, does not apply to all material
property that might be considered property under a natural rights theory. The First
Amendment includes the use value of almost all information within its ambit. See text
accompanying notes 118-20. Finally, the Fifth Amendment permits, even without com-
pensation, a substantial amount of regulation that does not amount to a taking, whereas
the First Amendment narrowly limits regulation of the use value of information. See Part
II.C.
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value of material property so long as the individual receives just
compensation. This difference in the constitutional protection for
information transmission rights and material property rights can
be understood in terms of Calabresi and Melamed's well known
distinction between property and liability rules."' Property
rules permit transfer of an individual right only through negotia-
tion and agreement; liability rules permit involuntary transfers
so long as compensation is paid."' The First Amendment pro-
vides individuals with a property right against the government's
interference with transmission of information: the government
does not have a right to stop you from speaking even it pays you
for your lost opportunity. The Fifth Amendment, however, pro-
vides individuals with only a liability right against government
interference with their material property: the government can
take your property so long as it provides you with just compensa-
tion.' Thus, in the terms of Calabresi and Melamed, the First
Amendment is a property rule, while the Fifth Amendment is a
liability rule."7
1.4 See Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv L Rev 1089, 1105-10 (1972).
m Id at 1105-06.
Id at 1106-08 (discussing the Fifth Amendment as a liability rule).
1 Calabresi and Melamed argue that the government is given an eminent domain
power because in some situations, due to transaction costs, collective decisions about the
value of property will be more efficient than individual negotiations. Id at 1106-07. Insofar
as we believe that the government is likely to be guided by motives other than efficiency,
this justification will be less persuasive.
But even if there were no more reason to be suspicious of the rulers' motives in
regulating information transmission rights than in regulating material property rights,
there would be two subsidiary reasons why the Fifth Amendment's liability rule would not
have been well adapted to information transmission rights. First, the holdout problems
that are a primary justification for takings by the state are not generally present in the
context of the use value of information. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons:
Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U Chi L Rev 711, 749-50 (1986)
(discussing the holdout rationale that justifies government taking). Second, as discussed
in the text accompanying notes 144-49, the use value of information is often realized
through the receipt of return information, through other property exchanges the trarismis-
sion facilitates, or through slight changes in the status or reputation of the information
transmitter. Assessing the use value of such information ex ante would often be more
difficult than assessing the value of material property. In light of these difficulties, the
'just compensation" provision would not be a workable way of compensating individuals
for the information that the government suppressed.
Of course, these differences between the use values of information and material
property are differences on average. For some material property, holdout problems are
unlikely, and for some material property, the calculation of value will likely prove diffi-
cult. But the Framers were practical thinkers who understood that the Constitution had
to draw clear distinctions capable of fairly mechanical application even if these distinc-
tions did not capture the complexity of each individual situation. See Douglas W. Kmiec
and John 0. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the Original Understanding, 14
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Second, the First Amendment differs from the Fifth in the
comprehensiveness of its definition of the property it protects.
The First Amendment protects transmission rights in a very
broad range of information-almost everything that could con-
ceivably have use value to an individual. Moreover, the informa-
tion for which transmission rights will be protected is defined
constitutionally and not with reference to state or federal law. On
the other hand, the Fifth Amendment, at least as currently inter-
preted, does not protect all entitlements that would be property
in Madison's or Locke's sense."8 Furthermore, the judiciary
substantially defers to existing law to decide whether there is a
property entitlement, thus permitting the state a substantial
measure of authority over property rights that it does not enjoy
with respect to information transmission rights."9 Although it
is not clear that the Takings Clause was intended to be quite as
narrow a limitation as it has become under current law," the
greater breadth of the First Amendment, like the more stringent
nature of its protections, may be justified on the view that rulers
have a greater motivation to interfere with the transmission of
information than with material property rights. Rulers thus
should be given less discretion to choose in advance the category
of information the transmission of which will be protected.
Finally, as discussed below, the Fifth Amendment permits
substantial regulation of material property without compensa-
tion, whereas the First Amendment permits regulation of infor-
mation for very narrow reasons consistent with natural rights
theory."2 This difference also reflects the greater concern about
the dangers of government regulation of the use value of informa-
tion.
Hastings Const L Q 525, 528 (1987) (arguing that the Contract Clause protected vested
rights only because that limitation permitted more mechanical judicial application).
"' For a discussion of the way in which current Takings Clause jurisprudence fails to
protect a full range of entitlements that would have been protected at common law, see
Wesley J. Liebeler and Armen Alchian, Constitutional Baselines by Virtual Contract: A
General Theory and its Application to Regulatory Takings, 3 S Ct Econ Rev 153, 154-55
(1993).
"' See Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S Ct 2886, 2900-01 (1992) (look-
ing to state law to define the interests protected by the Takings Clause).
120 For an argument for protecting a broader spectrum of entitlements under the
Takings Clause, see Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause
is Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 Colum L Rev 1630 (1988). But see William Michael
Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95
Colum L Rev 782, 796-98 (1995) (stating that Takings Clause was originally intended to
prohibit only physical takings of property).
121 See text accompanying notes 151-71.
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B. The Underlying Coherence of the First Amendment and the
Copyright Clause
Contrary to the views of some scholars,122 there is no fun-
damental tension between the First Amendment and Congress's
constitutional authority to provide the security of copyright pro-
tection to some information producers. Instead, both provisions
stem from the Framers' belief in the individual's natural property
right in his information: that right will be secure only if both the
right of transmission and the right of retention are protected.
The First Amendment and the Copyright Clause" in fact form
a coherent scheme to maximize effective protection for producers
of information, in the broadest sense, against threats of state and
private depredation, respectively. As discussed above, the First
Amendment prevents the government from reducing the use
value of property in information by interfering with its transmis-
sion, because such value is most dangerous to rulers and is,
therefore, most threatened by government. On the other hand,
the Copyright Clause authorizes Congress to prevent other citi-
zens from stealing one's property in information, because reten-
tion value is threatened more by acts of private theft than by
government expropriation.' Only when both the use value and
retention value of information are protected is the individual's
entire natural right to his property in information secured.
Understanding the interaction of the First Amendment and
the Copyright Clause as protecting informational property rights
in this way is in fact consistent with the Constitution's architec-
ture: maximizing the protection for natural rights in an imperfect
world was its principal objective.' Indeed, a review of the
"= See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods:
Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 Wm & Mary L Rev 665, 674-85
(1992) (suggesting that there is a substantial tension that was unrecognized at the time of
the Framing between the First Amendment's view of information as a public good and
copyright's treatment of information as a private good).
US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 8.
124 I define "use value" and "retention value" in Part I. See note 91 and accompanying
text.
12 Other constitutional provisions also reflect this underlying goal. For instance, Pro-
fessor Amar suggests that the reasonableness requirement for searches in the Fourth
Amendment should be interpreted so as to maximize protection of natural rights from the
related dangers of private violence (crime) and governmental intrusiveness. See Amar,
107 Harv L Rev at 793 (cited in note 58). Too restrictive a view of reasonableness will
lead to substantial increases in private violence because government will have difficulty
combatting crime; too lenient a view will lead to a substantial increase in government
intrusions because government will have the freedom to carry out searches that have
little effect on crime. See also McGinnis, 35 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1762-67 (cited in note
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Copyright Clause confirms that, like the First Amendment, it
was intended to protect an aspect of the individual's natural
property right in his information. The text of the Clause reads as
if it were protecting a natural right, but protecting it only to the
extent that enforcement through statute would redound to
society's benefit. The Clause provides Congress the authority "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries."'26 On its face, the
use of the term "securing," rather than a term like "granting,"
suggests that the authors had a natural right to this property,
which the government could then protect through copyright
law. 7
The natural rights roots of the Copyright Clause grow even
clearer when one looks to related documents from the time of the
Framing. Many of the state copyright laws of the time were even
more explicit than the Copyright Clause in their assertion that
copyright was designed to protect the natural property rights of
authors in their creation. For instance, New Hampshire provided:
As the improvement of Knowledge, the progress of Civiliza-
tion, and the advancement of Human Happiness, greatly
depend on the efforts of learned and ingenious persons in
the various Arts and Sciences; as the principal en-
couragement such persons can have to make great and bene-
ficial exertions of this Nature must consist in the legal secu-
rity of the fruits of their Study and Industry to themselves;
and as such security is one of the natural rights of all men,
there being no property more peculiarly a man's own than
that which is produced by the labor of his mind.2
The echo of Lockean natural rights ideas is both striking and
characteristic of many of the early state statutes.'29 The histori-
66) (suggesting that the Constitution was generally designed to maximize the protections
of rights against the twin dangers of private deprivation and state oppression).
126 US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 8. The linking of writings and inventions, in fact, suggests
that the Framers understood that information could be classified as property.
" See Dale A. Nance, Foreword: Owning Ideas, 13 Harv J L & Pub Policy 757, 763
(1990). But see Wheaton v Peters, 33 US (8 Pet) 591, 660-61 (1834) (rejecting this inter-
pretation of the word "secured").
12 See Act for the Encouragement of Literature (1783), reprinted in 4 Laws of New
Hampshire 521 (emphasis added).
12 Other state copyright statutes sounding in natural property rights are gathered in
Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 Ohio St
L J 517, 529 n 79 (1990).
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cal record also suggests that the Framers included a federal copy-
right provision not because they disagreed with the natural
rights theory that animated such state laws but because they
feared that variations in state laws and the difficulty of their
extraterritorial enforcement would not sufficiently protect these
rights. 1
30
Moreover, Madison was instrumental in drafting the Copy-
right Clause as well as the First Amendment. 3' Defending the
Clause in The Federalist Papers, he observed that:
The utility of [the Copyright Clause] will scarcely be ques-
tioned. The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged
in Great Britain to be a right of common law. The right to
useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the
inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases with
the claims of individuals.
132
The solemn adjudication that Madison understood to have ac-
knowledged copyright as part of English common law was Millar
v Taylor, decided in 1769."' That case in turn rested on a theo-
ry of natural property rights."" Indeed the judges who decided
it were heavily influenced by the same kind of Lockean theories
that Madison himself applied to create a property-centered theo-
ry of free speech.'35 The Copyright Clause and the First Amend-
.. Joseph Story, 3 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1147 at
48-49 (Da Capo 1970) (noting that in the absence of federal protection, authors "would
have been subjected to the varying laws and systems of the different states on this sub-
ject, which would impair, and might even destroy the valuer of their rights"). See also
Federalist 43 (Madison), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 271-72 (cited in note 86)
(noting that the states could not make "effectual provision" for copyright).
,' See Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective 192-94 (Vanderbilt
1968) (discussing Madison's role in proposing copyright protection at the Constitutional
Convention).
" Federalist 43 (Madison), in Rossiter, ed, Federalist Papers at 271-72 (cited in note
86).
], 98 Eng Rep 201 (KB 1769). Madison may also have been influenced in his view of
English law by Blackstone. See William M. Blackstone, 2 Commentaries *405-06 (inferring
copyright protection at common law).
"z' See Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective at 171 (cited in note 131).
" Lockean property-rights theory in fact influenced decisions in favor of a common
law copyright in England. See Zimmerman, 33 Wm & Mary L Rev at 689-92 (cited in note
122).
A few years later the House of Lords held that English authors no longer had a
common law copyright. Donaldson v Beckett, 98 Eng Rep 257, 262 (KB 1774). This case
did not deny, however, that authors originally had such a natural common law right, but
merely held that it had been superseded by the Statute of Anne of 1709. See Patterson,
Copyright in Historical Perspective at 174-76 (cited in note 131) (describing Donaldson's
analysis of common law right). In Federalist 43, Madison was referring to Millar despite
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ment flow from the same philosophical fount as well as from the
same author.
Unlike the First Amendment, however, the Copyright Clause
provides protection to a limited subset of information. For in-
stance, the Clause itself requires copyrightable work to be pro-
duced by "authors," and the Supreme Court has recently conclud-
ed that this concept of authorship requires a spark of originali-
ty.136 Moreover, the Clause does not provide automatic copy-
right protection to all information within its scope. Instead, it au-
thorizes Congress to protect retention rights in categories of
information that Congress may itself define. Congress has exer-
cised this discretion to restrict the ambit of copyrightable materi-
al by codifying a variety of limitations, such as the idea-expres-
sion dichotomy and the fair use doctrine.'
Nevertheless, the limitation in the scope of copyright is en-
tirely consistent with viewing the Copyright Clause as protecting
a natural right of information property. It was an axiom of
Locke's political theory that natural rights may be protected less
than comprehensively in civil society: greater security for rights
is sacrificed for their breadth. 33 Decisions as to how much soci-
ety will invest in the mechanisms for protecting various natural
rights in a world where their enforcement is costly depend, at
least to some extent, on the utility of protecting them.3 9
the intervening decision in Donaldson. See Yen, 51 Ohio St L J at 529 (cited in note 129).
"' Feist Publications, Inc. v Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 US 340, 345 (1991). This
construction goes back at least to the nineteenth century. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic
Co. v Sarony, 111 US 53, 59-60 (1884). For a discussion of Feist Publications, see Marci A.
Hamilton, Justice O'Connor's Opinion in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co.: An Uncommon Though Characteristic Approach, 38 J Copyright Soc'y 83, 86-
90 (1990).
31 See 17 USC § 102(b) (1988 & Supp 1993) (denying protection to ideas); 17 USC §
117 (1988 & Supp 1993) (permitting fair use). The idea-expression dichotomy and the fair
use doctrine were initially judge-made rules, but were not repudiated by Congress, and
were eventually codified.
'" See Barbara Friedman, Note, From Deontology to Dialogue: The Cultural Conse-
quences of Copyright, 13 Cardozo Arts & Enter L J 157, 162 (1994) (discussing this
bargain of the social contract in the context of copyright). For further discussion of this
proposition, see Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Con-
stitutions, 102 Yale L J 907-44 (1993); McGinnis, 35 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1779-80 (cited
in note 66).
" The degree to which natural rights should be enforced by government necessarily
requires a utilitarian calculus, because protecting the exercise of some natural rights
actually poses threats to others. First, protection requires resources that have to be raised
by taxing the exercise of natural rights. Second, enforcement requires establishing govern-
mental power that may ultimately be used to encroach on natural rights.
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Many of the categories of copyright depend on such judg-
ments. For instance, the requirement of originality may usefully
screen information to determine whether it can be practically
protected against third parties. Without an originality require-
ment, it would be hard to trace information to its origin and thus
hard to discover who owned it. The idea-expression dichotomy is
at least in part a response to the problem of setting boundaries
among ideas to determine their ownership.'4 ° Thus, copyright is
properly sensitive to the balance between the benefits of protect-
ing retention value and the costs of enforcement.
Whatever the proper limits of copyrightable information,
those limits do not encompass all of the information from which
individuals may obtain value.' Individuals realize use value
from transmitting information even when they cannot or do not
want to preserve retention value for information in their posses-
sion. Indeed, assertions of personal opinions, statements
about specific situations in the world, and predictions of future
events have long been transmitted without the retention of exclu-
sive rights, in the expectation of receiving return information or gain-
ing increased status." Those who receive that information in
' See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J Legal Stud 325, 349 (1989) (discussing enforcement costs of sorting out owner-
ship in ideas).
.1 Another indication that copyright does not define the entire scope of information
property is that we can easily conceive of legal regimes that would allow individuals to
preserve retention rights in what is now not subject to copyright. Information transmit-
ters could contract to permit others to use ideas on the condition that they not be trans-
mitted to third parties; the common law of torts could prevent third parties from interfer-
ing with those contracts. See Edmund W. Kitch, Intellectual Property and the Common
Law, 78 Va L Rev 293, 297-300 (1992) (discussing how contract and tort can be used to
protect information). Of course, monitoring and transaction costs might often make such
contracts impracticable. But this only serves to demonstrate that copyright should be
understood as an extraordinary enforcement mechanism to protect the retention value of
information property where such a right would be particularly valuable, and is not a limit
on the scope of information that can be conceived as property. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair
Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its
Predecessors, 82 Colum L Rev 1600, 1612-13 (1982) (copyight reduces transaction and
monitoring costs). Moreover, even current copyright law recognizes that state govern-
ments may establish supplementary legal regimes to protect some kinds of
noncopyrightable information, such as trade secrets. See 17 USC § 301 (1988 & Supp
1993) (copyright does not preempt state law protecting certain categories of information).
14 Information may not have sufficient retention value to be worth protecting even by
contract. See note 141. My discussion of the Internet will provide many examples of in-
stances in which individuals are in fact eager to publish their sentiments and ideas and
place them in the public domain without retaining any exclusive rights. See Part III.
'" Indeed, in the history of our species, social exchange of information came before
monetary exchange and even before the barter of information for goods. Because division
of labor was not well developed in hunter-gatherer societies, the payment for information
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turn often transmit it to others either in the same form or re-
fracted through their own intellect, thus gaining use value for
themselves.' Use value is also found in information such as
specific offers and promises that have little retention value. This
information nevertheless creates wealth by facilitating other
transactions valuable to the transmitter, including commercial
and political transactions, such as trade of material goods or
political coalition building.' Such information takes some ef-
fort to assemble and still is a valuable product for the producer,
thus coming within Madison's broad definition of property.'46
Thus, one reason that the First Amendment protects infor-
mation even when it is not copyrightable is that individuals may
realize use value from information from which they likely cannot
realize retention value. The other reason that the First Amend-
ment protects a broader class of information than copyright is
that it is less costly to society to prevent the government from
interfering with information transmission than it is to enforce
copyright protection. So long as the government simply refrains
from suppressing information and fulfills its ordinary police func-
tion of protecting persons and material property against violence
and theft,'47 a social exchange of information naturally occurs,
was often more information. See Wright, Moral Animal at 194-95 (cited in note 17) (In
hunter-gatherer societies, "[kinowing where a great stock of food has been found, or where
someone encountered a poisonous snake, can be a matter of life or death. And knowing
who is sleeping with whom, who is angry at whom .... can inform social maneuvering for
sex and other vital resources."). Even at academic conferences that ostensibly focus on
copyrightable papers, much of the interaction will be devoted to the exchange of gossip
about people and positions that may affect the career prospects of the employees. For a
fuller discussion of social exchange of information and its role in the evolution of human
nature, see McGinnis, Information Transmission (cited in note 23).
1' There is no problem in understanding that two individuals may have a right to
transmit the same piece of information to gain use from it. Since we do not seek retention
value in most information we transmit, many other people may have the right to transmit
and so realize its use value independently. Copyright itself recognizes that two people can
even have independent retention rights if each created the expression independently. See
Sheldon v Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F2d 49, 54 (2d Cir 1936) (Hand) ( Ijf by
some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats's Ode on a
Grecian Urn, he would be an 'author,' and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that
poem, though they might of course copy Keats's.").
" For the value of commitments to politics, see note 104 and accompanying text. For
a discussion of the pervasive manner in which information production facilitates nonzero
sum exchanges, see generally McGinnis, Information Transmission (cited in note 23).
146 See Madison, Property at 266 (cited in note 45) ("In its larger and juster meaning,
it embraces every thing to which a man may attach a value and have a right; and which
leaves to every one else the like advantage.").
... In order to maximize the use value of information, the government also has to pre-
vent private violence from suppressing transmission. However, the government is already
obligated by the social contract to enforce criminal laws against private violence.
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as individuals continuously realize the use value of their informa-
tion by transmitting it to others.' It is the task of the First
Amendment to protect this spontaneous order of information
exchange from interference by the state."
C. The Speech and Press Clauses Under a Property-Centered
Theory
This Part sketches a construction of the Free Speech and
Press Clauses based on the Madisonian/Lockean vision.50 A
First Amendment rooted in a natural property right should draw
on familiar concepts of natural rights and property more than
current First Amendment jurisprudence does. For instance, fa-
miliar ideas in natural rights theory-such as the proposition
that property cannot be used to deprive others of their property
by force or fraud-provide intelligible principles which allow the
Free Speech Clause to integrate a wide range of doctrines relat-
ing to permissible government restrictions on the dissemination
of particular categories of information. While a property-based
.. For discussion of the way beneficial social exchange can arise without mechanisms
of centralized control, see Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle
Disputes 230-64 (Harvard 1991).
"' Under a property-centered view of the First Amendment, there is no conflict
between copyright and the First Amendment when the government prohibits one author
from publishing information owned by another. In that case, the government is enforcing
a right in information property rather than interfering with it. It is permitting an individ-
ual to transmit his information and retain exclusive use, thus protecting the retention
value of his property.
Of course, if one agrees with Professor Gordon, as against John Stuart Mill, that the
Lockean proviso may be violated by granting too robust protection for intellectual proper-
ty, one might well draw a different line than that which currently exists between the
right of a citizen to control the dissemination of his information and the right of third
parties freely to disseminate it. See Gordon, 102 Yale L J at 1565-72 (cited in note 83)
(arguing against robust intellectual property rights because such rights would in many
instances not leave enough and as good in common for others, thus violating the Lockean
proviso). Nevertheless, even if the bundle of rights in information associated with copy-
right or trademarks should be differently defined by reconsidering the scope of these
natural rights, the First Amendment and copyright would still be protecting complemen-
tary aspects of a natural property right in information. Moreover, nothing in Gordon's
article suggests that the right as against the government to disseminate information is not
a natural right. Certainly such a transmission right leaves enough and as good for every-
one else.
" This Part does not purport to be a comprehensive or conclusive presentation of the
First Amendment doctrines that would be developed in a property-based jurisprudence. If
the Court were ever to embrace the property rationale of the First Amendment, it would
undoubtedly make different choices, at least as to details. Instead, this Part seeks to show
that a property-based jurisprudence can generate a set of doctrines at least as coherent as
current jurisprudence. The implications of a property-based jurisprudence for commercial
speech are discussed separately in Part IV. See notes 324-30 and accompanying text.
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view of the Free Speech Clause addresses restrictions on infor-
mation per se, I shall suggest that the Free Press Clause is ex-
pressly designed to limit the extent to which the government may
regulate the material property used for information transmission.
Like the construction of the Free Speech Clause, the property-
based construction of the Free Press Clause permits a unitary
analysis of numerous doctrines usually treated as unconnected,
such as time, place, and manner restrictions, limits on symbolic
speech, and the regulation of the mass media.
Of course, a property-centered construction of the Free
Speech and Press Clauses does not dissolve all the hard ques-
tions that have bedeviled the First Amendment, but it does en-
able us to employ well established natural rights and property
concepts to make useful analogies. Indeed, one of the advantages
of understanding the First Amendment through the prism of
property is the discipline it imposes on government in all its
avatars-legislative, executive, and judicial. Public agencies will
be forced to analyze speech issues using concepts developed with-
out reference to any conscious or unconscious interest of rulers in
suppressing or skewing speech.
1. The Free Speech Clause.
A natural-property-rights view of speech suggests that the
Free Speech Clause should be interpreted to protect absolutely
the right to transmit information, subject to the usual Lockean
limitations. 5' The only legitimate Lockean restrictions on the
transmission of information per se are those designed to prevent
information from being used to deprive others of their life or
property by force or fraud. 5 ' Under this view, there is no place
for ad hoc judgments on what is intrinsically high and low value
speech.'53 Restrictions on the transmission of information are
instead judged under a single standard that looks only to wheth-
er they threaten a deprivation of life or property by force or
fraud." The harder questions for the theory are how stringent-
... Locke's law of nature requires that "no one ought to harm another in his Life,
Health, Liberty, or Possessions." Locke, Two Treatises at 289 (cited in note 43).
152 As we shall see, restrictions related to information-producing material property
rather than to information per se are to be tested under standards derived from the Free
Press Clause. See text accompanying notes 172-202.
" For a discussion of the Supreme Court's categorization of some speech as low
value, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm &
Mary L Rev 189, 194-97 (1983).
1 The application of a single mode of analysis, however, would not overturn all cases
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ly the requirement of force or fraud will be interpreted and what
kinds of property interests will be protected from deprivation by
such means.
Under any plausible interpretation of the force or fraud pro-
viso, the property-centered Free Speech Clause would still clearly
permit the punishment of criminal solicitation. A person wrongly
deprives someone of property as much by ordering someone un-
der his employ to steal it as by taking the property directly.
Blackmail may also be forbidden because its natural consequence
is to breed fraud and deceit-the blackmailer has every incentive
to join his victim in continuing to perpetrate fraud against third
parties.
155
The property-centered view of the First Amendment also
helps us understand the full reticulation of the clear and present
danger test of Brandenburg v Ohio5 as an attempt to shape
the proper boundaries of force and fraud in the context of law-
lessness. Brandenburg held that speech advocating lawless action
is unprotected under the First Amendment only if it is both "di-
rected to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action."'57 At the root of
Brandenburg is the proposition that incitement to break the law
threatens to deprive citizens of the security for property that
animated the social contract in the first place. It is, therefore, a
use of information that is not protected under the Lockean
scheme. But Brandenburg's requirement of a likelihood of imme-
diate success in causing lawlessness is appropriate because of the
general suspicion of rulers' motives for information regula-
tion. ' This second prong of the Brandenburg test makes it
harder for government to prohibit speech that threatens the
perquisites of rulers or their supporters by claiming that harm
will result from a lengthy causal chain the links of which are
hard to evaluate.'59
that uphold government regulation of particular kinds of information. For instance, a the-
ory rooted in property rights may provide a firmer basis for the holding of New York v
Ferber, 458 US 747, 773-74 (1982), that pornography produced by using children may be
totally prohibited. Just as the state can prevent individuals from accepting money from a
minor because a minor lacks power to consent, so can the state prohibit pornographers
and users of pornography from making use of a minor's image, another form of property.
' See Richard A. Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U Chi L Rev 553, 564-65 (1983).
' 395 US 444 (1969).
7 Id at 447.
". For discussion of the reasons for such suspicion, see notes 102-12 and accompany-
ing text.
' Originally, "fighting words" were punishable without regard to their likelihood of
1996]
The University of Chicago Law Review
Brandenburg's first prong, requiring that the speaker intend
to produce imminent lawless action, also flows directly from the
Madisonian/Lockean theory of the First Amendment. If the focus
were on the actions of the audience alone, the test would permit
the so-called heckler's veto: by threatening violence or riot the
audience could effectively silence the speaker.6 ' A rule that fo-
cused on the reaction of the audience rather than the intent of
the speaker would encourage audiences to behave badly in reac-
tion to speech they opposed in the hope that it would be sup-
pressed. Such a rule would drive society back to a kind of state of
nature where one individual could with impunity deprive another
individual of his property-in this case the use value of his infor-
mation. The whole point of a Lockean scheme, however, is to
make rights more secure by substituting the rule of law for the
state of nature. Thus, the heckler's veto creates opportunities for
the systematic theft of individuals' property in their information.
As such, it has no place in the Madisonian/Lockean First Amend-
ment.
Since the sole basis for restricting information under the
Lockean scheme is deprivation of property (or life), the property
concepts of the common law-themselves developed under the
strong influence of natural rights theory--can also help us deter-
mine what interests may be legitimately protected against injury
by speech. 6' The longstanding nature of the concepts also pro-
vides assurance that the interests the government protects in
this context have not been chosen with an intention of suppress-
ing or manipulating speech. Some interests are uncontroversial:
the interests in real and personal property have long been pro-
tected at common law and by statute against private violence and
fraud. Their status as property in our legal system can hardly be
attributed to any interest in repressing speech. An individual's
causing a breach of the peace. See Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 315 US 568, 574 (1942).
The movement in current law is to incorporate the "clear and present danger" test into
the fighting words doctrine, and thus permit the regulation of fighting words only insofar
as they are intended to, and are likely to, cause immediate disruption. See Nadine
Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 Duke L J 484,
508-14 (outlining current trends in fighting words doctrine). Thus, in this area, current
law approximates the kind of standard a property-based jurisprudence would embrace.
"o See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1946-1953, 37 Emory
L J 249, 265 (1988) (pointing out that early versions of the clear and present danger test
facilitated the heckler's veto because they did not take account of the intent of the
speaker).
'6 Even opponents of a natural rights jurisprudence concede that the development of
the common law resulted in categories shaped by theories of natural rights. See Cass R.
Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum L Rev 873, 879 (1987).
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interest in reputation also was recognized as a property right at
common law.'62 It is true that this interest can be injured only
by information transmission and redressed only by slander or
libel law, thus perhaps raising suspicion that it was created to
facilitate the suppression of speech. Nevertheless, reputation is
closely related to other common law property interests that had
important roles in contexts other than speech-related torts, such
as goodwill'63 and the right of publicity.'" Given reputation's
place in the web of the common law, it is hard to argue that
reputation's status as a property interest was established simply
for the purpose of suppressing speech. Under a property-based
understanding, libel laws thus do not necessarily violate the First
Amendment.
A property-based understanding does suggest, however, that
the Court is correct to temper the law of libel to keep the protec-
tion of reputation within proper bounds. The Madisonian/Lockean
regime distinguishes natural rights from the political structure
created to protect these rights. Accordingly, while the reputation
one acquires in the private sphere is property to be protected,
reputation in the political realm is merely part of the instrumen-
tal political structure for the protection of property.165 Libel and
slander laws in this distinct context are best understood as
means of protecting the position of the rulers--one of the very
considerations that moved the Framers to give information prop-
erty special constitutional protection. Therefore, public officials
are not entitled to the same safeguards for their public reputa-
tions. The implications of the Lockean view thus suggest that in
New York Times Co. v Sullivan, Justices Black and Douglas may
have been justified in arguing that the press should be absolutely
immune from liability for criticizing the way public officials do
their public duty.66
" See Alain Sheer and Asghar Zardkoohi, An Analysis of the Economic Efficiency of
the Law of Defamation, 80 Nw U L Rev 364, 369 (1985).
'" The reputation of an individual is much like the goodwill of a business. See Stew-
art E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 Va L Rev 383, 438-41 (1993)
(Common law recognized property interest in goodwill.).
' See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and
Publicity Rights, 81 Cal L Rev 125, 132 & n 23 (1993), citing J. Thomas McCarthy, The
Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 6.1[B] at 6-5 to 6-8 (Clark Boardman Callaghan 1990)
(right now recognized in fifteen states).
'" Another way of looking at this is to view reputation in the political realm as a kind
of property of the political system rather than as individual property. This view would
also provide support for lobbying restrictions by former government officials who are
trying to profit from what is not truly theirs-their reputation gained through politics.
1- 376 US 254, 293 (1964) (Black, joined by Douglas, concurring). Under this view,
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Under a property-based theory of the First Amendment, hate
speech regulations would likely be invalidated. 1 7  To defend
hate speech codes in a property-based regime, one would have to
posit a property interest in self-esteem to be protected against
injury by hate speech. Property interests in self-esteem were not
well established at common law. 6 ' Moreover, unlike injury to
tangible property interests or even reputation, injury to self-es-
teem-whether understood as that of an individual or that of a
group-raises enormous difficulties of objective proof. Thus, it
gives rise to inherent dangers of discrimination against First
Amendment rights. 69 Moreover, since no one advocates strict
liability for all speech that intentionally causes emotional distur-
bance, hate speech regulation poses a serious dilemma. Enabling
each person to determine for himself which feelings are to be
protected against speech is to permit a heckler's veto. 70 On the
other hand, allowing the government to pick and choose what
however, the Court is probably wrong to extend the limited immunity afforded criticism of
public officials to "public figures." See Curtis Publishing Co. v Butts, 388 US 130, 154-58
(1967) (football coach held to be "public figure" and subject to New York Times v Sullivan
standard). General fame is a private asset and thus can be protected as a personal
reputational interest under the libel laws. For discussion of why the negligence standard
rather than strict liability should be applied in libel cases, see note 185.
" Sometimes hate speech may constitute fighting words that may be appropriately
punished under the property-based view of the First Amendment. See note 159. The Su-
preme Court recently invalidated a hate speech ordinance on the grounds that it was
radically underinclusive as to the kinds of words it covered. See R.AV. v City of St. Paul,
505 US 377, 380 (1992) (invalidating statute that punished expression arousing "anger,
alarm or resentment in others" on the basis of a limited number of categories). For a
discussion of the role of underinclusiveness in a property-based First Amendment juris-
prudence, see notes 181-202 and accompanying text.
'" Even proponents of hate speech regulation concede that such feelings were not his-
torically protected at common law against injury by speech. See Jean C. Love, Discrimina-
tory Speech and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 47 Wash & Lee L
Rev 123, 126 (1990) (noting that courts followed the proverb "[siticks and stones may
break my bones, but names will never hurt me").
" See John M. Blim, Undoing Our Selves: The Error of Sacrificing Speech in the
Quest for Equality, 56 Ohio St L J 427, 476 (1995) ("The attempt to distinguish racist and
sexist speech from other types of offensive speech can only be based on the strength of the
emotions it creates in its critics, something less than an objective barometer of what kinds
of speech must be suppressed."). Reviewing a claim for damages stemming from outra-
geous parody, the Supreme Court recently noted the danger that a tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress based on comment or opinion could pose to the First
Amendment: "'Outrageousness' in the area of political and social discourse has an in-
herent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of
the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of particular expres-
sion." Hustler Magazine, Inc. v Falwell, 485 US 46, 55 (1988).
70 For a discussion of the heckler's veto and Lockean theory, see text accompanying
notes 160-61.
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feelings to protect would pose obvious dangers of political manip-
ulation.'71
2. The Free Press Clause.
Turning from the Free Speech Clause's treatment of restric-
tions on information per se, we look to the property-based con-
struction of the Free Press Clause to address one of the most
recurrent and intractable problems in First Amendment jurispru-
dence-the appropriate standard for assessing government regu-
lation of the material property used to transmit information.
Given that material property is essential to the transmission of
much information, how can the government's general authority to
regulate material property be prevented from becoming a vehicle
to suppress or skew speech?7 2 This issue arises under various
doctrinal headings-symbolic speech (where the symbols are
generally material); time, place and manner regulation (where
the regulation is of material property); and taxation and regu-
lation of information-producing enterprises (where media enter-
prises, like other enterprises, use material processes of produc-
tion).
All of these problems share a common connection to a prop-
erty-based understanding of the Press Clause.' Understanding
that the protection of transmission rights increases the use value
individuals enjoy in their information clarifies the special focus
on the press in the text of the First Amendment: the press at the
time of the Framing was the most efficient medium through
which individuals could disseminate their ideas and sentiments
most widely and therefore most beneficially.'74 Of course, this
171 Compare R.AV., 505 US at 391 (invalidating statute that prohibited only certain
kinds of epithets on grounds that selective prohibition was a form of government censor-
ship).
1 As we have seen, the Takings Clause does not prevent the government from
regulating material property. See notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
1.. The relation between the Speech and Press Clauses has puzzled scholars, with
most viewing the Clauses as expressing a single idea. See David A. Anderson, The Origins
of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L Rev 455, 456-57 (1983) (discussing interpretations of the
relationship). The Court has never relied on the Press Clause alone to decide the outcome
of any case. Id at 457.
114 There is substantial evidence that the Framers included freedom of the press
because it was the medium for publishing thoughts to a wide audience. Pennsylvania, the
first of the three states to recommend a Press Clause, made this relationship clear in its
proposal: "That the people have a right to the freedom of speech, of writing and of pub-
lishing their sentiments; therefore, the freedom of the press shall not be restrained by any
law of the United States." See Pennsylvania Convention Debates, 1787, in Bernard
Schwartz, 3 The Roots of The Bill of Rights 641, 658 (Chelsea House 1980). Virginia and
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medium, like modern media of mass communication, required
substantial material property and personnel to propagate infor-
mation. Thus the problem of protecting the press was and is
emblematic of the more pervasive need to protect information-
producing property from government suppression and manipula-
tion.
As discussed above, the struggle for a free press in England
was a struggle to liberate the press from the peculiar system of
centralized control that had been imposed on it through the Reg-
ulation of Printing Acts. 75 Indeed, Blackstone wrote that "the
press became properly free, in 1694 [the date Parliament failed to
renew these acts]; and has ever since so continued."'76 A free
press, of course, did not mean a press free from all regulation:
the press was certainly subject to other generally applicable
laws.' By the time of the Framing, however, a free press was
generally understood to encompass freedom from special rules
not generally applicable to business enterprises, such as laws
that required licenses or permitted the government to confer
monopoly rights on favored citizens. 78
North Carolina substantially tracked Pennsylvania's language in this regard. See Virginia
Ratifying Convention, 1788, in Bernard Schwartz, 4 The Roots of The Bill of Rights 766,
842 (Chelsea House 1980); North Carolina Convention Debates, 1788, in Bernard
Schwartz 4 The Roots of The Bill of Rights 933, 968 (Chelsea House 1980). Madison's first
proposed wording of what are now the Free Speech and Free Press Clauses similarly
incorporated the notion of publishing sentiments as a description of the press's function.
See 1 Annals of Cong 451 (June 8, 1789) ("The people shall not be deprived or abridged of
their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press,
as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.").
Thus, as a matter of constitutional history, the speech right is clearly not an after-
thought, although I recognize that for much of colonial history the freedom of the press,
rather than the freedom of speech, was at the center of the struggle for individual rights
against the state. See Anderson, 30 UCLA L Rev at 533 (cited in note 173).
'7 See text accompanying notes 46-52.
7 William M. Blackstone, 4 Commentaries *152 n a. For further discussion of this
point, see Mayton, 38 Emory L J at 720-27 (cited in note 40).
... Social and regulatory norms with respect to material property at this time were
largely libertarian. The common law had evolved to facilitate the enjoyment of individual
property rights: acquisition, possession, use and disposition. See Carol M. Rose, Possession
as the Origin of Property, 52 U Chi L Rev 73, 73-75 (1985) (Both Locke's labor theory of
property and the common law possession theory provided individuals with substantial
property rights.). Whether the common law evolved these rules to maximize efficiency and
promote wealth creation, see Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 28-31 (Little,
Brown 2d ed 1977), or to mask the irreconcilable contradiction between autonomy and
community, has been disputed. See Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's
Commentaries, 28 Buff L Rev 205, 211-17 (1979).
' There is substantial agreement that the concept of the freedom of the press pre-
cluded federal licensing laws or government-enforced monopolies. Scholars also agree that
the Free Press Clause precluded prior restraints. See Leonard W. Levy, ed, Freedom of the
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The general principle that emerges from the history of the
press known to the Framers is that the way to protect material
property rights essential to the operation of the press was to
ensure, at the very least, that only rules of the kind that were
applied to other business enterprises could be applied to the
press.'79 This principle also comports with the rationale for pro-
viding special protection to property in information-fear of gov-
ernment suppression and manipulation. 8 ' If the government is
prevented from applying special rules to the material property
used for information production, there is substantial assurance
that the government is not framing the rules to interfere with
property in information. Under this view, laws of general appli-
cability, such as employment or antitrust laws, may be applied to
the material property used for information transmission, but
laws imposing special burdens or departing from general norms
applicable to property used for purposes other than information
transmission are forbidden. 181
Restrictions on information-producing property may depart
from norms in at least two ways. First, the restriction may be
underinclusive in that it is not generally applied to other uses of
the property that have similar effects. Second, the restriction
may also be underinclusive in that it is not generally be applied
to similar information-producing property. Either kind of depar-
Press from Zenger to Jefferson: Early American Libertarian Theories lv (Bobbs-Merrill
1966). Like a licensing law, a prior restraint can be understood as a deviation from the
common law's treatment of business enterprises; under the common law, other enterprises
were not normally subject to licenses or prior restraints, but rather only to after-the-fact
liability for damages they caused. Of course, I am not arguing here that all the Framers
immediately understood all the implications of this emerging principle.
"' William Van Alstyne makes a similar point about both the First and Second
Amendments. He suggests that these amendments permitted citizens to be held account-
able for abusing firearms or the press, but prevented the government from forbidding or
specially licensing these items as a precaution against abuse. See William Van Alstyne,
The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 Duke L J 1236, 1250 (1994).
" For discussion of the place of this rationale in the property-based theory, see notes
102-12 and accompanying text.
8 ' If this interpretation of the Press Clause is to offer substantial protection to trans-
mission rights, the requirement that regulation be no more burdensome than the norm
applied to similar property used for purposes other than information transmission is an
important one. Because of interest group politics, some kinds of material property are
likely to be regulated more than the norm. If the most heavily regulated similar property
were the standard for the regulation of property used for information transmission, much
transmission could be curtailed. The emphasis on the regulatory norm seems consistent
with original operation of the Clause. While at the time of the Framing, licensing require-
ments had been applied to some enterprises other than the press, such requirements were
not the norm.
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ture from regulatory norms would violate a property-based un-
derstanding of the First Amendment.'82
This interpretation of the Press Clause-as restricting the
government's authority to regulate the material property used for
information transmission-provides a unitary analysis of First
Amendment law that can be applied across disparate doctrinal
areas.'" Although the Court has never expressly adopted this
theory of the Press Clause, cases concerning the regulation and
taxation of media enterprises come close to the implicit use of
such an analysis. For instance, in Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co. v Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, the Court struck down a
"use tax" on paper and ink products because it was not applied to
the inputs of other business enterprises.TM More recently, in Co-
hen v Cowles Media Co., the Court upheld a plaintiff's right to
recover damages for breach of a newspaper's promise of confiden-
tiality because the doctrine of promissory estoppel under which
the plaintiff sued applied equally to media and other enterpris-
es.
85
12 Since the construction of the Free Press Clause offered here is designed to prevent
the government from discriminating against information-producing uses of material
property, it is not surprising that it has much in common with underinclusiveness analy-
sis of the Equal Protection Clause, since that too is built around an antidiscrimination
principle. See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, in Marshall Cohen,
Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon, eds, Equality and Preferential Treatment 84, 97-98
(Princeton 1977) (arguing that antidiscrimination principle is at the heart of the
underinclusiveness analysis in the Equal Protection Clause context). See also Melville B.
Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L Rev
29, 39-42 (1973) (criticizing overly narrow statutes that restrict symbolic speech).
1" The interpretation of the Press Clause offered here has some kinship with the
Court's recent decision in Employment Division v Smith, 494 US 872, 879 (1990), where
the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause was not violated by laws that were neutrally
applied to a religious practice even if they burdened that practice. This construction of the
Press Clause also focuses on a question of neutral application-whether rules designed to
protect against certain harms are equally applied to property used for information trans-
mission and property used for other purposes.
u 460 US 575, 582-85 (1983). The Court held that the tax was unconstitutional on
two separate grounds: the tax was applied uniquely to newspapers, see id at 586-90, and
the tax was applied selectively to a small group of newspapers, see id at 591-92.
1- 501 US 663, 669-70 (1991). The debate over the proper tort standards in libel ac-
tions can be framed in a similar manner. Since tort actions against enterprises producing
material goods generally require proof of actual damages, the Court has rightly been sus-
picious of strict liability and presumed damages in the libel context. See Gertz v Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 US 323, 349 (1974) (holding that the First Amendment prohibited pre-
sumed damages, at least when plaintiffs do not prove knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth). See also David A. Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and
Proof, 25 Wm & Mary L Rev 747, 774-78 (1984) (arguing that defamation actions should
generally be subject to the same proof demands as other torts). Similarly, if most torts re-
quire proof of negligence, and do not presume its existence, such proof should be required
in the libel context as well.
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The constitutionality of regulation of public property should
be viewed through the same prism. Although streets are publicly
owned, citizens have the equivalent of easements in streets
through which they are free to convey their bodies and material
property. On this account, they may also use streets to convey or
display their property in their information.8 ' Of course, just as
the state regulates the use of streets to prevent nuisances caused
by the use of material property (I can't walk down the street with
a huge burning torch), the state can prevent the use of streets for
information transmission where such transmission will have
effects similar to the effects of other prohibited uses of material
property.'87 For instance, demonstrations may be prohibited
outside schools, if the city would also prevent the use of material
property with effects similarly distracting to children at the
school.' 8
Of course, establishing a constitutional baseline that requires
one to compare time, place, and manner regulations with regula-
tions on the use of streets for purposes other than information
transmission does not remove the need for judgment in hard
cases. But the focus on property rights does provide helpful
guides from contexts where the state has formulated rules not
aimed at suppressing speech.'89 For instance, in Heffron v Intl
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., the Court permitted the
county to restrict distributors of literature at a state fair to fixed
"3 Thus, Professor Kalven was correct to say that individuals had a "kind of First-
Amendment easement" in streets and parks, see Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the
Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 S Ct Rev 1, 13, but the source of that right should
be found in the non-First Amendment easement that permits individuals to use streets
and parks for all sorts of non-information-producing purposes. The easement for informa-
tion production may be circumscribed only on the same principles by which the non-First
Amendment easement is circumscribed. See note 187 (discussing nineteenth-century cases
that undertake this kind of analysis).
"8, Some nineteenth-century state courts employed a similar theory to provide free
speech protection to demonstrations conducted on public property. They held that demon-
strations could proceed unless they created effects that would be prohibited under the
common law of nuisance. See In the Matter of Frazee, 63 Mich 396, 30 NW 72, 74 (1886)
("[A]n actual nuisance can be suppressed just so far as it is noxious, and its noxious
character is the test of its wrongfulness."); Anderson v City of Wellington, 40 Kan 173, 19
P 719, 722 (1888) (striking down ordinance preventing public assemblies on the grounds
that it precluded traditional uses of public property that did not cause a nuisance).
'" See Grayned v City of Rockford, 408 US 104, 117-21 (1972) (upholding ordinances
prohibiting loud demonstrations on streets next to a school during class hours).
'" For instance, in evaluating whether the state is affording similar treatment, a
court might assess the diminution in property values caused by adult entertainment and
other nuisances that the state does not regulate.
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booths. 9 ' The constitutionality of such a restriction under the
analysis offered here would depend on whether the state imposed
similar regulations on other enterprises, such as balloon or food
sellers. 1
Consider also City of Renton v Playtime Theatres, Inc., in
which the Court upheld a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult
theaters from locating within one thousand feet of any residential
zone, dwelling, church, park, or school.'92 While the Justices de-
bated whether the restriction was content based,'93 the question
under a property-based theory would have been whether the city
similarly restricted uses of material property that would have
adverse effects similar to those created by adult movies.' For
instance, if a city consistently applied similar zoning restrictions
to uses of material property that had similar deleterious effects
on the value of surrounding property, the adult theater ordinance
should be upheld.'
The regulation of symbolic speech can be addressed in a
similar manner. Symbolic speech is expression created by the
manipulation of material objects: regulation of these materials is
suspect if the government does not similarly regulate like materi-
al property when it is put to uses which have similar effects.
Under this analysis, the questions now asked in symbolic speech
cases would change. For instance, in United States v
O'Brien'9 -- the case that considered whether a statute penal-
452 US 640, 654 (1981).
It appears the rules did apply equally to all enterprises, information-producing and
non-information-producing. Id at 643-44.
19 475 US 41, 54-55 (1986).
193 Compare id at 46-49 (Rehnquist), with id at 56-58 (Brennan dissenting).
1 Justice Brennan did observe that the zoning ordinance seemed underinclusive
because it did not apply equally to all adult entertainment. City of Renton, 475 US at 57-
58 (Brennan dissenting).
" Of course, if consumers of adult entertainment were to review the materials in
their homes, such activity would be no more likely to affect surrounding property values
than many other domestic activities. Because the state does not regulate the use of homes
for such domestic activity, it would face great difficulty in justifying regulation of indecent
or even obscene material in the home. See Stanley v Georgia, 394 US 557, 565 (1969)
(State cannot punish a person for reading obscene material in his own home.). The digital
revolution, see text accompanying notes 246-53, will give rise to increased opportunity to
access such materials through cable or telephone wires.
Under the property-based theory, one could regulate pornography if it created the
equivalent of a clear and present danger of causing rape or other conduct that would
interfere with others' natural rights. Most analysis of pornography suggests that it does
not create such a danger. See Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 366-72 (Harvard 1992)
(reviewing the literature on the relationship between pornography and sex crimes).
19 391 US 367 (1968).
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izing the burning of draft cards violated the First Amend-
ment-the Court did not directly focus on the issues that would
be dispositive under a property-based jurisprudence: (1) whether
the regulation relating to the draft cards applied equally to com-
municative and noncommunicative acts that rendered draft cards
unavailable for their governmental use, and (2) whether similar
regulations were applied to similar material property (such as
social security cards and other important documents issued by
the government). Instead the Court suggested that the draft card
mutilator who had an expressive purpose deserved some First
Amendment protection irrespective of how the regulation dealt
with those who mutilated similar documents for nonexpressive
purposes.197 The central question for the Court was whether the
protester's First Amendment interest was outweighed by the
government's interest in enforcing the regulation.'98
Even though the test suggested here for symbolic speech
does not confer a special First Amendment privilege on the user
of material property for symbolic communicative conduct, it may
in many cases be more protective of speech than the test an-
nounced in O'Brien, because in applying that test, courts tend to
defer to the government's interest in regulating material.'99 The
property-based test would more stringently assess the
government's neutrality and good faith. For example, in O'Brien
itself, the property-based test might well have resulted in rever-
sal of the draft protester's conviction. The burdens of the regula-
tion in that case did not fall equally on all those who made their
draft card unavailable for official purposes, but rather fell on
those who knowingly destroyed or knowingly mutilated their
draft cards."' (For instance, the regulation did not appear to
1"7 Id at 376-77. See also William W. Van Alstyne, First Amendment: Cases and
Materials 253-54 (Foundation 1991) (questioning whether those who violate a law to make
a political point should be given special First Amendment protection).
199 O'Brien, 391 US at 377 ("[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified... if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest... unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression.. . ."). Some commentators have thought this is less a bal-
ancing test than a "no gratuitous inhibition" test. See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A
Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88
Harv L Rev 1482, 1490 (1975). Conceptualized as such, the O'Brien approach is far less
protective of speech than the balancing test used in cases involving "more familiar forms
of expression" and that concern time, place, and manner regulations. Id. One of the
advantages of the property-based construction of the First Amendment is that it creates a
single test for both familiar and unfamiliar uses of material property for expressive
purposes.
' Ely, 88 Harv L Rev at 1484-89 (cited in note 198).
" O'Brien, 391 US at 370.
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apply to those who knowingly lost their draft cards."°1) More-
over, there is a serious question whether the regulation was the
norm applied to similar property such as other government iden-
tity documents. Indeed, legislative history quoted in O'Brien
suggests that Congress passed the regulation for draft cards
alone, and that at least some members of Congress were motivat-
ed by animosity toward antiwar protesters." 2
To sum up: besides its consonance with the actual theory
underlying the original First Amendment, the new approach has
several advantages over traditional jurisprudence.0 3 First, it
discards the unprincipled and unstable distinction between high-
and low-value speech; instead, the property-based interpretation
provides a unitary standard of force and fraud for evaluating
government restrictions on information. Second, by subjecting all
regulations of information-producing property to a test designed
to discover government suppression of speech, it would minimize
201 Professor Nimmer suggests that the "overnarrowness" of the statute suggested that
the government was targeting expressive conduct. See Nimmer, 21 UCLA L Rev at 40-41
(cited in note 182).
20 O'Brien, 391 US at 385-86 (noting that legislative history was specifically con-
cerned with "defiant" destruction of draft cards).
Thus, under the property-based view, both of the recent flag burning cases were
rightly decided. The statute at issue in Texas v Johnson punished desecration of the
flag-that is, action with respect to the flag that offended other individuals. 491 US 397,
400 n 1 (1989). There, burning the flag to produce information (about the flag-burner's
attitude toward the United States) was treated differently from burning the flag for other
communicative purposes or no communicative purpose at all. (For arguments that offen-
siveness to other individuals is not a legitimate reason to distinguish the effects of ac-
tions, see notes 167-71 and accompanying text.) Thus, the government regulated an infor-
mation-producing use of material property differently than it regulated other uses, in
violation of a property-based understanding of the First Amendment. In United States v
Eichman, the statute ostensibly punished all knowing mutilation or burning of the flag
regardless of purpose. 496 US 310, 314 (1990). Nevertheless, the statute made exceptions
permitting the burning of "soiled or worn" flags. Id at 317. Moreover, the government
conspicuously failed to regulate other similarly situated property-like the flags of other
nations, the burning of which differs in its effects only in that it is less offensive. Thus,
the statute in Eichman also treated flag burning differently than similarly situated
property and should likewise have been invalidated under a property-based understand-
ing of the First Amendment.
20 Under the current "two-track" approach, if the government regulation is "content
based"-that is, aimed at the communicative impact of the activity regulated-it is subject
to strict scrutiny and will be struck down unless supported by a substantial interest.
Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-2 at 789-92 (Foundation 2d ed
1988). If the regulation is not content based, it will be upheld so long as it does not
"unduly constrict" the flow of ideas. Id at 792. In contrast, under the property-centered
view, information itself can be regulated only on the basis that it threatens others' proper-
ty through force or fraud. On the other hand, the material property used for information
production may be regulated only to the extent that similarly situated material property
is similarly regulated.
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the importance of the distinction between content- and non-con-
tent-based regulation-a notorious source of contention and con-
fusion."' Moreover, this inquiry would replace the balancing
test traditionally applied to non-content-based restrictions. That
test has been heavily criticized for requiring the courts to engage
in ad hoc weighing of the incommensurable interests of the
citizen's freedom to speak against the government's interest in
regulation."' By comparing the contested regulation with the
regulatory norms under which the government treats activity
with similar effects or under which it treats similar property, this
approach should prove less indeterminate than the existing bal-
ancing test."6 Thus, the property-based test should make it
more difficult for the government to reduce speech opportunities unfa-
vorable to the rulers.0 7
Under a property-centered view of the First Amendment,
however, there may be one additional basis for regulating the
press and similar instruments of mass communication. When the
material used for propagation of information does not meet the
Lockean proviso for sustaining property rights-for instance, if
the material is too scarce to leave "as much and as good in com-
mon," thus precluding opportunities for communication-there
may be a Lockean argument for special regulation of means of
communication limited to addressing this problem.0 ' In the
next Part, I discuss what the property-based interpretation of the
Speech and Press Clauses, including the Lockean proviso, sug-
gests for government regulation of the modern networks that are
today's most efficient media for the wide and beneficial
transmission of information.
' See Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34
Stan L Rev 113, 113 (1981) (stating that the Court's content distinction is both "theoreti-
cally questionable and difficult to apply").
... See Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech
and Free Speech Theory, 44 Hastings L J 921, 945-47 (1993) (criticizing the coherence of
the balancing tests employed to analyze non-content-based restrictions).
" For discussion of the way in which such a comparison may be made, see text
accompanying notes 192-95.
" For a specific example of how this property-centered analysis catches governmental
manipulations, see Part III.B.
"' For discussion of the Lockean proviso and Madison's adaptation of it, see text ac-
companying notes 80-83.
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III. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE NET
Were James Madison drafting the First Amendment today,
he might well word it: "Congress shall make no law abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the net." The net would have replaced
the press because computer networks are fast becoming the most
cost-effective way of delivering information. Therefore, they are
becoming the medium in which citizens can most effectively real-
ize the use value of their information. Indeed, the development of
such nets represents yet another important step in what is likely
the long-term trend most important to civilization's progress: the
decreasing cost of transmitting information to others."9
A. The Spontaneous Order of the Internet
The Internet is the best known and most wide-ranging of the
computer networks. Its growth is an example of spontaneous
order arising from the decisions of thousands of individuals and
corporations without the central direction of the state.210 Al-
though the first network or net of computers that came to com-
pose the Internet was established by the United States as part of
the defense system, and funding for this network subsidizes the
system, 1' government involvement is not, a necessary precondi-
The decreasing cost of producing information-caused first by the invention of the
printing press, then by the application of methods of the industrial revolution to printing,
and finally by the ongoing revolution in electronics and computers-is detailed in Ithiel de
Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom 11-22 (Belknap 1983). For concrete examples of the
transformations in politics and business that may result from declining information costs,
see text accompanying notes 298-300.
I disagree with Professor Katsh's claim that technological revolution changes our
culture or way of thought by bringing with it a new internal logic (as when he suggests
that the print revolution encouraged linear thinking which itself facilitated the concepts of
rights). See M. Ethan Katsh, Rights, Camera, Action: Cyberspatial Settings and the First
Amendment, 104 Yale L J 1681, 1685-92, 1700-12 (1995). Evolution has given us innate
modes of thought and goals. Each information revolution has simply enabled us to exer-
cise our powers of raciocination and pursue our goals more efficiently. The lower transac-
tion costs associated with the more efficient delivery of information are principally respon-
sible for transforming the institutions that shape culture.
21' For a discussion of the concept of spontaneous order, see FA. Hayek, The Fatal
Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, in W.W. Bartley, III, ed, 1 The Collected Works of FA.
Hayek 3, 6, 83-84 (Chicago 1988).
211 See Where Did the Internet Start?, Christian Sci Monitor 10 (July 18, 1994) (noting
that Internet began as an Advanced Research Projects Agency network called Arpanet).
Decades ago it would have been thought beneath the dignity of a law review to cite a
popular newspaper, but now newspapers and magazines are frequently cited in law re-
views. Law review writing is not a self-enclosed world; it is imbedded in a larger network
of information exchange. It is already part of an interlocking network of communication
systems, and will soon be physically part of the Internet, as a file for law review articles
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tion for creating a wide ranging net. In Europe, for instance, a
vast network called Eunet has been created by telephone compa-
nies and other telecommunication providers."
Moreover, the growth of the Internet was neither anticipated
nor encouraged by government; it was first spurred by the aca-
demic community. Universities sought to connect their different
departments through e-mail.213 These universities then connect-
ed to the defense system and one another in a way that left no
one net in charge of the aggregation of networks.214 Commercial
networks are now arising to connect individuals outside the uni-
versity community. These private networks range from the mil-
lion-strong Prodigy to smaller but more sophisticated operations
such as Pipeline.215 The Internet encompasses more than e-mail
communications. Universities and other institutions have created
various databases that are freely accessible.216 Educational and
commercial services are developing routines--called, inter alia,
gophers, browsers, and spiders-to help Internet users find their
way through the web of information to the appropriate databas-
es.21" With the rise of Internet connections, individuals have be-
gun special discussion groups, where parts of cyberspace are
dedicated to specific topics from politics to theater to engineering
to jokes, as well as subtopics of these categories.2"8 Today, the
Internet continues to grow exponentially.2
is integrated into that system.
212 See Dan L. Burk, Patents in Cyberspace: Territoriality and Infringement on Global
Computer Networks, 68 Tulane L Rev 1, 18 (1993) (discussing private networks).
213 See Where Did the Internet Start?, Christian Sci Monitor at 10 (cited in note 211).
For a general history of the Internet, see Daniel P. Dern, The Internet Guide for New
Users 8-18 (McGraw-Hill 1994).
214 Discussion groups on the Internet take a variety of forms, including newsgroups on
Usenet and mailing lists such as listservs. Usenet is a worldwide discussion system with
a set of "newsgroups" that are classified by subject matter. Messages may be posted to
these groups by those with appropriate computer programs, and read by anyone on the
Internet whose provider allows access to the particular newsgroup. Harley Hahn and Rick
Stout, The Internet Complete Reference 162-63 (McGraw-Hill 1994). A mailing list permits
individuals to send e-mail to all who have signed up on the list. Id at 529-33. In this
Article, I use the term "discussion group" to include both kinds of mechanisms for ex-
changing information.
"' See Elizabeth Corcoran, Apple Joins Expanding On-Line World: Graphics, Loyal
Users Provide an Edge, Wash Post Washington Business 17, 23 (June 20, 1994) (discuss-
ing the variety of competing commercial Internet connections).
21. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Battle for the Soul of the Internet, Time 50, 52-53 (July 25,
1994).
217 Id at 53.
"2 See id at 53-54 (discussing wide variety of newsgroups).
211 See Peter H. Lewis, Doubts Raised on Number of Internet Users, NY Times D1
(Aug 10, 1994) (suggesting widespread agreement that the number of Internet users is
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Thus, the Internet in particular, and computer networks in
general, demonstrate the property-centered theory of speech in
action because they show both the importance of the use value of
information and the manner in which individuals spontaneously
deploy material property to maximize the value of information,
including its use value. First, computer nets show that individu-
als may realize use value from infdrmation from which they real-
ize no retention value. Many users are pleased to have their
messages broadly disseminated by those who receive them; in
return they obtain return information or improved reputa-
tion."' Information transmitted through the Internet may also
facilitate other valuable private, commercial, or even political
transactions.22'
Second, computer nets show how, in the absence of govern-
ment regulation, individuals spontaneously deploy material prop-
erty to increase its value, including its use value. The growth in
transmission links in nets is propelled by the exercise of private
property rights of individual and corporate entities of various
kinds as they pursue their own interests. For instance, commer-
cial services have arisen that permit consumers to connect to the
Internet. Universities provide links to aid their employees, in the
expectation that the employees will use them in a way that will
redound to the overall benefit of the universities.222 This growth
has been achieved with no guidance from the state and little
regulation outside the enforcement of private ordering through
contract.223
doubling every year). There is disagreement on whether this growth is quite as dynamic
as it seems. Some of the growth comes from networks that offer access to the Internet
only for limited purposes such as e-mail. Id at D4. However, it is hardly surprising that
consumers first will use the most user-friendly features of the Internet. As features such
as search routines make other aspects of the net more friendly to the less initiated, we
can expect growth in uses beyond e-mail.
' Some of the return information may simply be information about who is interested
in the information the senders transmit. Such information is valuable in itself because it
may reduce the search costs of finding potential customers, partners, or other commercial
opportunities. Nevertheless, some e-mail senders may wish to keep retention rights in the
information that they send to discussion groups and other individuals. For a discussion of
how to create rules protecting retention rights in cyberspace, see note 236.
" Individuals in fact have found mates through e-mail. See Tom Steinert-Threlkeld,
Virtual Marriage, Dallas Morning News LA, 1A, 7A (Feb 12, 1994) ("Many on-line romanc-
es ... have resulted in conventional marriages.").
For instance, scholars may participate in academic discussion groups, making
comments that enhance their own reputation and that of their university.
Some might argue that since these links use telephone lines they benefit from at
least one government regulation-the requirement that telephone companies be common
carriers. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 USC §§ 201-02 (1988 & Supp 1993) (requir-
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In fact, computer nets have also structured themselves to
create new mechanisms that facilitate the exchange of informa-
tion. Discussion groups, for instance, in staking out portions of
cyberspace for a particular topic, increase the value of informa-
tion transmission rights by gathering the appropriate audience
for particular exchanges of opinions and ideas. If I want to ex-
pand my ideas about difference feminism or Civil War battles on
the street, in the faculty lounge, or even in a general circulation
newspaper, I am likely to miss many interested listeners. Discus-
sion groups give speaker and potential audience a more efficient
way of finding one another.
Indeed, one of the more celebrated controversies in the
Internet's history-sparked appropriately enough by a law-
yer-powerfully demonstrates the use value of information and
the amenability of cyberspace to property-rights analysis. In
April 1994, a lawyer from Phoenix irritated Internet users
around the world by putting advertisements on a large number of
special-subject discussion groups. 2 4 While he claimed that his
action was wholly legal,2" under a property-rights paradigm it
can be understood as the first publicized prototrespass in
cyberspace, with the lawyer playing the role of the snake in the
Garden of Eden. By staking out a particular area of cyberspace
for a particular use (we may call such spaces "cyberfiefs"), the
creators of a discussion group should gain ownership of the
space, including the classic hallmark of ownership-the right to
exclude others.2 Certainly, assigning ownership rights to those
ing telephone companies to provide service to all comers without discrimination). Under
the property-rights theory offered here, such regulation may once have been justified
when telephony was a natural monopoly. Similar service requirements are imposed on
natural monopolies constituted by material property not used for the purpose of informa-
tion transmission, such as utilities. It is certainly true that the common carriage re-
quirement was historically not subject to First Amendment challenge. See Cate, 30 Wake
Forest L Rev at 20-24 (cited in note 22). Now, the conditions that made telephony a nat-
ural monopoly are disappearing and the common carrier requirements may themselves
become subject to First Amendment attack. Id at 24. For further discussion of the techno-
logical changes that permit digital information to be transmitted in a variety of ways and
render telephony only one of several competitors for such communication, see text accom-
panying notes 250-58.
" Peter H. Lewis, An Ad (Gasp!) in Cyberspace: Lawyer's Message Violates
?Vetiquette', NY Times D1 (Apr 19, 1994).
Id at D2.
It might be thought that the ownership rights should belong to the Internet provid-
er that sells time on the Internet to the creator of the discussion group. But even if these
rights were nominally assigned to the provider, we would expect them to be effectively
exercised by the creator because they are more valuable to the creator. See R.H. Coase,
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1, 15-16 (1960) (in the absence of transaction
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who create discussion groups is consistent with the famous
Lockean proviso that those wishing to assert a property claim
over matter they have transformed by their labor should leave
"enough and as good" for others."7 Being infinitely expandable,
cyberspace satisfies the proviso as well as anything known to
man.
22 8
The advertisement was a prototrespass or protoconversion
insofar as the lawyer entered a part of cyberspace that others
had dedicated to a particular use incompatible with that of the
trespasser.29 The lawyer was at liberty to set up a discussion
group for ambulance chasing, but chose instead to free-ride on
others' efforts. ° In doing so he reduced the value of the
cyberspace that he violated: potential users would be deterred
costs, rights will gravitate to highest valuing user). The creator is a higher-valuing user
because he knows better than the Internet provider what rules will maximize the value of
his cyberfief.
Of course, cyberfief owners are under no compulsion to establish rules that will facil-
itate their right of exclusion. Many discussion groups, particularly in the Arcadian days of
the Internet, were open to all kinds of messages and depended on custom and etiquette to
preserve the value of the space. As the Internet community becomes more numerous and
less tightly knit, law is likely to become more necessary to preserve value.
For discussion of the Lockean proviso, see text accompanying notes 80-83.
Under this view we may see cyberspace as a place where, at least for the purposes
of information exchange, we may create the kind of utopias that philosopher Robert
Nozick conceives:
Every rational creature in this world you have imagined will have the same rights of
imagining a possible world.., as you have. The other inhabitants of the world you
have imagined may choose to stay in the world which has been created for
them.., or they may choose to leave it and inhabit a world of their own imagining.
If they choose to leave your world... your world is without them. You may choose to
abandon your imagined world, now without its emigrants. This process goes on;
worlds are created, people leave them, create new worlds, and so on.
Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia at 299 (cited in note 82) (footnote omitted). As Nozick
points out, to create stable viorlds the creator cannot act like an absolute monarch and
exploit the other inhabitants, or they will leave. Id at 300. So it will be with cyberfiefs:
those who create them will have to consider the other participants' interests in the fram-
ing of the cyberfief's rules if they want to have a vibrant and valuable space.
' Cyberfief owners can establish the rules that will regulate their bit of cyberspace in
a variety of ways. They may assign their rights to another group that will actively moni-
tor the discussion group. (They may also issue discussion group charters establishing
decision procedures in advance: such charters could increase the value of that particular
piece of cyberspace.) Of course, most of the time such rules will not need to be invoked
since users of discussion groups can be expected to make a good faith effort to stay within
the confines of the topic.
' The unearned advantage the lawyer obtained was the attention of devotees of the
particular discussion group who momentarily looked at his message because the creators
of the discussion group had engendered expectations that the space would be used for a
particular subject.
1996] Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment
from connecting to a particular discussion group due to the clut-
ter of messages on unrelated topics.
At first, the reaction of other users of the affected discussion
groups was the classic reaction of property owners (and those
who benefit from a fledgling system of property rights) before a
centralized system for enforcing property rights has been estab-
lished: they engaged in self-help.23' They sent so many messag-
es to the offending lawyer (in cyberspeak they "flamed" him) that
his e-mail systems became useless.232 Such encroachments on
cyberspace property rights may be punished by the law just as
trespasses on real property and conversions of personal property
were punished at common law.2 3   In punishing such
transgressions, government would not make substantive rules for
a particular bit of cyberspace: it would merely enforce the rules
that the owners made known as the rules of their cyberfief.2"
These government enforcement mechanisms would be general in
scope, and thus would carry little risk of government interference
with the right to produce ideas and transmit them over the
Internet.235 The government's role thus can be limited to provid-
" See Douglas Ivor Brandon, et al, Self-Help: Extrajudicial Rights, Privileges and
Remedies in Contemporary American Society, 37 Vand L Rev 845, 850 (1984) (discussing
self-help as the progenitor of our legal system).
2~2 See Lewis, An Ad (Gasp!) in Cyberspace, NY Times at Dl (cited in note 224).
The hallmark of the common law is its ability to adapt established principles to
new situations. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 Harv
L Rev 443, 447-51 (1899) (using the term "integration" to describe the internal logic of the
common law as it expands to address new situations).
Private advertising firms are already establishing guidelines for advertising on the
Internet. See Lawrence M. Fisher, Advertising, NY Times D16 (Aug 3, 1994) (reporting
statement of executive at the advertising firm of Ogilvy and Mather that advertising
should appear only in lists and groups designated for that purpose).
' Thus, the substantive rules for cyberspace should not be established by the govern-
ment but by those who own the cyberfief. The best alternatives to government regulation,
however, are not uniform model agreements reached by major Internet providers. See
Robert L. Dunne, Deterring Unauthorized Access to Computers: Controlling Behavior in
Cyberspace Through a Contract Law Paradigm, 35 Jurimetrics 1, 12-13 (1994) (suggesting
model agreement approach). This would replace tyranny by government with tyranny by
monopoly. See Mark A. Lemley, Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace, 35 Jurimetrics 311, 321
(1995). The natural process of competition among Internet providers should instead
devolve such authority to owners of cyberfiefs. Since customized rules increase the value
of particular cyberfiefs to their creators and users, cyberfief creators and users would then
be willing to pay more to the Internet providers who permitted the decentralized creation
of rules. So long as there is competition, decentralized rules will be in the interest of both
providers and users.
Compare Madsen v Women's Health Center, Inc., 114 S Ct 2516, 2538 (1994) (Scalia
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Statutes targeted at speech in specific areas,
such as labor relations or abortion, or injunctions extending only to such specific areas,
pose dangers to the First Amendment.).
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ing more efficient enforcement for property rights of those who
own various parts of cyberspace, thereby increasing the value of
information to individuals who produce it.236
Issues of censorship have also arisen on the Internet. Prodi-
gy, the largest commercial interconnecting system, has recently
developed "George Carlin" software to excise offensive words sent
to the users of their network."7 Such acts have raised questions
about whether the government should itself regulate the Internet
in order to protect speech. 8 Viewing the Internet through the
prism of spontaneous order raises doubts about the need for
governmental intervention in the decisions of networks about
what to permit on their own nets.239 Under the property theory
offered here, Prodigy has a right to censor its network but its
consumers have a right to take their business elsewhere. Since
there is no centralized censor exercising the sovereign power of
the state, paths will spontaneously arise to carry information
with substantial use value.' °
Allowing private individuals to set the rules for their cyberfiefs may solve a variety
of problems other than trespass. For instance, one vexing problem is the question of to
what extent members of a discussion group may further disseminate messages sent to
that group. See I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace", 55 U Pitt L
Rev 993, 999 (1994). A property-based theory suggests that the owner of the relevant
cyberfief may establish rules to decide such questions. There is no reason for government
to impose a centralized solution.
' Peter H. Lewis, No More Anything Goes': Cyberspace Gets Censors, NY Times Al
(June 29, 1994).
23 Id at D5.
' Of course, any decision by the government itself to censor speech should be subject
to First Amendment scrutiny. While this is not the place to detail how a property-based
jurisprudence might address the many proposals to restrict pornography or indecency on
the Internet, a few elements of such an analysis can be sketched. Consider a hypothetical
federal proposal that would prohibit all "indecent information" from being circulated on
the Internet, for fear that children could access it. In considering this bill, one would want
to analyze restrictions on other material property where indecent information is present.
For instance, bookstores are not currently banned by federal law from displaying indecent
material. While the presence of indecency and pornography on the Internet may force par-
ents to supervise their children's choices of what information they access, the availability
of printed indecent material already forces adults to supervise what their children read.
Moreover, the end-user computer capabilities of the Internet allow the parent actively to
select what will be received through his computer. See notes 248-52 and accompanying
text. Since competition will provide incentives to Internet access services to facilitate end-
user control with blocking services, parents (even without the aid of government regula-
tion) should be able to control their children's access to material from the Internet even
more effectively than they currently control their children's access to printed material.
240 The reasons that private censorship is unlikely to succeed given current develop-
ments in information technology are lucidly set forth in Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech
and What It Will Do, 104 Yale L J 1805, 1836-38 (1995). For discussion of why a single
transmission link is unlikely to gain monopoly power, see text accompanying notes 254-
57.
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The original Internet principle that all information should be
free of charge would inhibit some transmission of beneficial infor-
mation.24' Some information will be transmitted only if users
are willing to pay for it specifically. But this "free information"
principle is not inherent in the notion of a network or of a prop-
erty-rights approach to speech, and is now being relaxed.242
There is no reason that particular information on computer nets
cannot be made available only to those who pay.2' For in-
stance, newspapers can set up services providing supplemental
information to their subscribers.2" So long as the government
does not prevent commercial use of computer nets, there is every
reason to expect that the exercise of property rights in informa-
tion transmission will assure that the net will continue to put its
decentralized, low-cost information system to a growing multi-
plicity of uses that reflect the multifarious interests of individu-
als.2'
B. Property and the Expanding Net versus Turner
While the print press, broadcasting, and cable television are
today vibrant and largely distinct enterprises from the computer
networks that gave rise to the Internet, they are converging into
a system that will resemble computer nets in its decentralized
and spontaneous order. The principal difference will be that com-
puter nets of the future will facilitate the transmission of infor-
mation not only in textual form, but in multimedia form, includ-
ing sound and video. The reason for the convergence of transmit-
ters of multimedia into a netlike system is the digital revolution
in telecommunications. All information can be translated into a
digital form called "bits."2 46 The information can then be
21 Elmer-Dewitt, Battle for the Soul, Time at 53 (cited in note 216). This principle was
the result of the continuing involvement of the government in the Internet: the National
Science Foundation did not wish to subsidize commercial use. See Burk, 68 Tulane L Rev
at 15 (cited in note 212).
242 See Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges
to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 Yale L J 1639, 1657 & n 65 (1995).
2 For instance, information may be provided only to those who have a password to
access it. Information can also be released only upon payment with "digital" cash. For a
discussion of digital cash, see A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptogra-
phy, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U Pa L Rev 709, 720 (1995).
24 News stories may thus become windows into far more comprehensive and complex
bites of information compiled by reporters for the interested reader.
24 One complex issue that the Internet will have to face as it expands is a more
complex pricing and metering system. For a discussion of these issues, see The Internet:
Freeloading as a Way of Life 9, 12, in The Economist at 50 (July 1-7, 1995).
21 See Nicholas Negroponte, being digital 11-17 (Knopf 1995) (explaining bits as the
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transmitted electronically at the speed of light.247 When a bit of
information is transmitted electronically, computers can select
and rearrange the information at the point of reception." The
"declining cost of computing has permitted the processing and
storage of information to become more decentralized, thus en-
abling the intelligence in the telecommunications network to re-
side ... in the dispersed customer premise equipment of ultimate
consumers rather than with some central provider of switching
and transport."249 The intelligence that edits and selects infor-
mation for our consumption no longer has to reside entirely at
the point of transmission, as it does now in the editorial staff of a
newspaper or the programming manager of a broadcaster. The
individual can become his own program director and editor by
programming his computer to retrieve particular information
from the nets to which he is linked. The result is substantial
decentralization of control over the information that is transmit-
ted over computer nets.
Further, digital technology is providing more and more op-
portunities for different kinds of broad-bandwidth network pro-
viders of video services to compete.250 Conventional television
broadcasters and cable are now being supplemented by micro-
wave and satellite broadcasting 5' and even phone lines. 2
This multifarious delivery of information means increased compe-
tition:
"smallest atomic element in the DNA of information").
247 Id at 14.
28 Id at 19-20 (discussing rise of intelligence at the point of reception of information
rather than at the point of transmission).
249 J. Gregory Sidak, Telecommunications in Jericho, 81 Cal L Rev 1209, 1209-10
(1993), reviewing Michael K. Kellogg, John Thorne, and Peter W. Huber, Federal Telecom-
munications Law (Little, Brown 1992) and Peter W. Huber, Michael K. Kellogg, and John
Thorne, The Geodesic Network II: 1993 Report on Competition in the Telephone Industry
(Geodesic 1992).
'o Bandwidth has been described as "the capacity to move information down a given
channel." Negroponte, being digital at 22 (cited in note 246).
" For instance, Bill Gates, the chairman of Microsoft, and Craig McCaw, the chair-
man of McCaw Cellular, have established Teledesic, a "network of 840 satellites that
would provide wireless voice, data, and video transmission to any point on the globe."
James Fallows, Networking, Atlantic Monthly 34, 36 (July 1994). At the other end of the
stratosphere, the company Metricom plans to create local networks by hanging low power
transmitters on light and telephone poles. Id. Many of these media are now also being
improved by digital compression, which permits, for instance, as many as ten television
signals "to fit into the bandwidth that previously had been occupied by one." Sidak, 81 Cal
L Rev at 1209 (cited in note 249).
2 Unfortunately Congress has restricted the ability of the telephone companies to of-
fer certain information services. See text accompanying notes 281-87.
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With digitalization all of the media become translatable into
each other--computer bits migrate merrily-and they escape
from their traditional means of transmission. A movie,
phone call, letter, or magazine article may be sent digitally
via phone line, coaxial cable, fiberoptic cable, microwave,
satellite, the broadcast air, or a physical storage medium
such as tape or disk.253
As the leading treatise on telecommunications law observes, any
market power previously possessed by the providers of informa-
tion services is disappearing; this is due to the competition
brought about by convergence of many previously distinct meth-
ods of transmission into a single market for the transmission of
digital information.' Contrary to the claims of those favoring
government regulation of telecommunication, there is little risk
of a "bottleneck" in the modes of transmission that would inhibit
consumers from enjoying the information services they want.25
This new cornucopia of modes of transmission dissolves the
one possible justification for special regulation of the material
property used for transmission of information. Under the
Madisonian First Amendment, regulation of the means of trans-
mission might be justified when the material property for trans-
mission is so scarce that its use by one transmitter fails to leave
opportunity for others to transmit information." 6 Today, the
' Stewart Brand, The Media Lab 18 (Penguin 1988).
' See Michael K. Kellogg, John Thorne, and Peter W. Huber, Federal Telecommuni-
cations Law § 3.8 at 187 (Little, Brown 1992). What monopoly power exists generally
derives from exclusive rights over messages that are protected by copyright. Id.
Id. Even the seemingly most entrenched communications monopolies are losing
their power. For instance, local exchange service will soon encompass not only traditional
telephony, but also new competitors such as "cellular radio, radio-based personal commu-
nication services, wireless LAN's, [and] cable television." See William R. Malone, Book Re-
view, 45 Fed Comm L J 333, 337 (1993), reviewing Michael K. Kellogg, John Thorne, and
Peter W. Huber, Federal Telecommunications Law (Little, Brown 1992), Peter W. Huber,
Michael K. Kellogg, and John Thorne, The Geodesic Network II: 1993 Report on Compe-
tition in the Telephone Industry (Geodesic 1992), and Daniel L. Brenner, Law and Regula-
tion of Common Carriers in the Communications Industry (Westview 1992).
' For discussion, see text accompanying notes 208-09. The question of whether the
Lockean proviso is ever completely satisfied, given physical scarcity, is a much debated
one. I agree with Geoffrey Miller, who believes that one must interpret the Lockean
proviso consistently with sustaining a state with very robust private property rights, be-
cause vindicating such a state was Locke's rationale for writing Two Treatises. See
Geoffrey P. Miller, Economic Efficiency and the Lockean Proviso, 10 Harv J L & Pub
Policy 401, 406 (1987) ("The problem for interpreting the Lockean Proviso therefore re-
solves itself into a matter of determining how, under conditions of scarcity and trade, the
Proviso can limit the enclosure of resources from the commons without undermining the
basic purposes of private property."). The proper interpretation must give weight to the
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opportunities for transmission through the expanding net will be
much greater than those afforded, now or ever before, by print
media."7 Because the outlets for video programming allow at
least as much opportunity for transmittal of information as the
outlets for print did in Madison's time, it is fair to conclude that
private and unregulated ownership satisfies the Lockean proviso
at least to the degree that print media satisfied the proviso at the
time Madison drafted the First Amendment." 8
The Court's most recent decision in the telecommunications
area-Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v FCC259-- was in error
precisely because it failed to apply the logic of a property-cen-
familiar social considerations favoring private property, such as efficiency and decen-
tralization of power, see Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia at 176-77 (cited in note 82),
permitting the Lockean proviso to be satisfied even though there is a limited supply of
goods in the common. At least some of these considerations (such as decentralization) are
weakened when there is acute physical scarcity or a natural monopoly, and thus greater
regulation may be justified in such unusual cases.
For an interesting argument that the Lockean proviso is always satisfied in an ad-
vanced market economy that provides infinite ways of accumulating capital, thus making
it possible to buy even the scarcest goods, see Rapaczynski, Nature and Politics at 208-11
(cited in note 76).
" Today only 24 out of 1,516 U.S. localities are served by two or more unaffiliated
local daily newspapers. Kellogg, Thorne, and Huber, Federal Telecommunications Law §
3.8.2 at 189 n 11 (cited in note 254). The scarcity rationale for regulation of transmission
is far stronger in the newspaper context than in the video programming market.
All physical goods, including newsprint, are scarce. From a standpoint of pure
economic efficiency, scarcity does not justify regulating broadcasting any more than it
justifies regulating newsprint. See R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission,
2 J L & Econ 1, 14 (1959). But as discussed above, see note 256, considerations other than
efficiency may determine whether Lockean rights theory is satisfied by a particular
system of property rights. Scarcity may thus still be a relevant consideration in justifying
a regulation.
I recognize the powerful argument that government regulation of broadcasting's
content was never justified because the First Amendment views the government as the
overwhelming danger to free speech, even if private appropriation of the speech transmit-
ting property arguably does not satisfy the Lockean proviso. See Message to the Senate
Returning Without Approval the Fairness in Broadcasting Bill, 1987 Pub Papers 690-91
("History has shown that the dangers of an overly timid or biased press cannot be averted
through bureaucratic regulation, but only through the freedom and competition that the
First Amendment sought to guarantee."). My point here is simply that even on a reading
of the Speech and Press Clauses that is faithful to their roots in Lockean property rights,
including the proviso, special regulation of the video communication media can no longer
be justified.
In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v FCC, Justice O'Connor shares the spirit, if not
the letter, of these arguments. See 114 S Ct 2445, 2480 (1994) (O'Connor concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("But the First Amendment as we understand it today rests
on the premise that it is government power, rather than private power, that is the main
threat to free expression; and as a consequence, the Amendment imposes substantial
limitations on the Government even when it is trying to serve concededly praiseworthy
goals.").
'9 114 S Ct 2445 (1994).
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tered understanding of the First Amendment to the emerging
modern means of multimedia communication. At issue in Turner
was the constitutionality of must-carry rules that Congress had
applied to the broadcasting industry. These rules, peculiar to the
video communications industry, require cable operators to assign
essentially one-third of their stations to local commercial broad-
casters and local noncommercial educational broadcasters.260
Declining to apply strict scrutiny to the provisions because they
were not content based, the Court did not invalidate the
rules.26' On the assumption that the provisions were content
neutral, the Court instead applied the O'Brien test,2 62 which re-
quires the government to show that the restrictions on First
Amendment freedoms were supported by a substantial interest
and that they were no more restrictive than necessary to further
that interest.2 63 The Turner Court thus remanded the case to
the lower courts with instructions to review the provisions under
this standard, while affording substantial deference to Congress's
factual findings on the nature of the interest at stake-in this
case, maintaining the viability of the broadcast industry."
The Court correctly recognized that cable was not subject to
the conditions of physical scarcity that it had previously held
justified special regulation of the broadcast spectrum.265 Thus,
2" See The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 §§ 4-5,
Pub L No 102-385, 106 Stat 1460, 1471-81, codified at 47 USC §§ 534-35 (1988 & Supp
1993). The Act mandates that all cable operators with more than twelve channels carry
the signals of licensed "local" commercial broadcast television stations whose signals are
received over-the-air in the same television market as cable. The cable operator is not
required to fill up more than one-third of its channels with such broadcasters, but if there
are not enough broadcasters to meet its one-third quota, the operator must carry the
signals of one or two low-power stations. Section 5 of the Act requires cable operators with
more than thirty-six channels to carry the signal of every noncommercial educational
broadcast station unless the programming substantially duplicates that of a station al-
ready carried. Systems with fewer than thirty-six channels must carry between one and
three educational broadcasters. For further description of the intricacies of the must-carry
rules, see Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v FCC, 819 F Supp 32, 36-37 (D DC 1993).
... Turner, 114 S Ct at 2458-72.
212 The test formulated in O'Brien, permits a content-neutral regulation affecting
speech if the regulation:
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental re-
striction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
391 US at 377.
" Turner, 114 S Ct at 2469.
2 4 Id at 2471-72.
" Id at 2456-57. The scarcity rationale for regulation of the broadcast spectrum was
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it held that cable television enjoyed greater First Amendment
protection than the protection previously afforded broadcasting,
although the Court was vague as to the degree of additional
protection.266  Under the property-based view of the First
Amendment, however, once the Court had concluded that the
multimedia communications market of which cable is part was
not subject to peculiar conditions of scarcity, it should have inval-
idated the must-carry requirements on the simple ground that
these were rules of a kind not generally applicable to business
enterprises. Given that scarcity in this market is no more severe
than in the print press, there is no justification for Congress to
apply any rules to communications technology beyond those rules
generally applicable to all businesses, such as antitrust, securi-
ties, and labor laws.267 Certainly, it is unusual for business reg-
first noted in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v FCC, 395 US 367, 396-401 (1969). At issue in
Red Lion was the constitutionality of the so-called fairness doctrine. The fairness doctrine
required that broadcasters provide fair coverage of opposing viewpoints on controversial
issues of public importance. The Court upheld this regulation in part because of the
physical scarcity of the electromagnetic spectrum. Id at 388-89, 396-401. For an excellent
discussion of the dramatic difference between the "broadcast model" of the First Amend-
ment and the "print model," see Thomas G. Krattenmaker and L.A. Powe, Jr., Converging
First Amendment Principles for Converging Communications Media, 104 Yale L J 1719,
1719-24 (1995).
2" Turner, 114 S Ct at 2457. Even in its discussion of scarcity, Turner displays the
incoherence characteristic of opinions negotiated for a narrow majority. The Court thus
left somewhat opaque whether cable was to be regulated under the same standards as
print or under some third standard all its own. Id at 2457 (suggesting that "settled
principles of [ ] First Amendment jurisprudence" should be applied to cable, but that
cable's "unique physical characteristics" should also be taken into account). Nevertheless,
the Court did seem to conclude that the severe scarcity that it felt had characterized
broadcast television outlets in the past simply did not apply to cable.
The Court also failed to modify its previous First Amendment standard for broad-
casting despite the fact that its announcement of a different standard for cable seems to
undermine fatally the scarcity rationale underlying the lesser degree of protection for
broadcasting. The Court stated that "[alithough courts and commentators have criticized
the scarcity rationale since its inception, we have declined to question its continuing
validity as support for our broadcast jurisprudence, and see no reason to do so here." Id
(footnotes and citations omitted) (emphasis added). It is difficult, however, to understand
how broadcasting can be evaluated in the future under wholly distinct First Amendment
standards from that of cable. Cable and broadcasting are competitors in the market for
live home video programming. Resources for such transmission that are not scarce in a
constitutional sense when cable alone is at issue cannot become scarce when broadcasting
is added to the market.
2" Sidak argues on the basis of somewhat different First Amendment reasons that the
FCC should interpret its public interest mandate as requiring no more than that telecom-
munication companies comply with the antitrust laws. See Sidak, 81 Cal L Rev at 1234-38
(cited in note 249). See also Cate, 30 Wake Forest L Rev at 46-47 (cited in note 22) (noting
that antitrust is available to protect against natural monopoly).
Under my view, the broadcast industry would be able to challenge cable operators'
alleged bottleneck on consumers' access to home video programming under antitrust
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ulations to require businesses to help their competitors, as cable
was required to maintain the viability of broadcasting.2" Turn-
er thus dramatically displays the difference between current
jurisprudence and a property-centered jurisprudence of the First
Amendment in the analysis of government regulations of private-
ly owned media of communication.
Turner itself also shows why the property-based interpreta-
tion of the First Amendment is necessary to protect communica-
tion media from government interference."' After concluding
that cable should receive substantial First Amendment protec-
tion, the Court agreed that the rules should be invalidated if they
were content based because then the government would be trying
to skew the market for communications.7 0 The application of
the traditional content-based inquiry, however, was not sufficient
to prevent such skewing. First, as the Court admitted, distin-
guishing between content-based and content-neutral regimes is
not simple."' The difficulty of the task will lead courts to make
mistakes. In Turner, the Court in fact made such a mistake. It
failed to recognize that because local broadcasters operated under
a public interest regime that required them to provide local is-
sues programming, and cable did not, the contents of broadcast
rationales that seek to maximize consumer welfare. The Court has consistently rejected
the notion that the press is exempt from antitrust laws. See Lorain Journal Co. v United
States, 342 US 143, 155-56 (1951) (The First Amendment permits Congress to "appl[y] to
a publisher what the law applies to others."). Indeed one relevant antitrust concept-the
essential facilities doctrine-was established in the press context. See Associated Press v
United States, 326 US 1, 19-20 (1945). For reasons suggested below, see text accompany-
ing notes 280-86, I find unpersuasive the broadcasters' arguments that cable is inhibiting,
in a manner that harms consumer welfare, their ability to compete. Accordingly, I believe
their antitrust claims would likely fail.
" For discussion of why the First Amendment requires the application of regulations
no more restrictive than the norm applied to similar material property, see text accompa-
nying notes 179-81.
" The application of the Press Clause to modern means of communication is not at
all difficult for an originalist. See Judge Bork's concurring opinion in Ollman v Evans:
In a case like this, it is the task of the judge in this generation to discern how the
framers' values, defined in the context of the world they knew, apply to the world we
know. The world changes in which unchanging values find their application. The
fourth amendment was framed by men who did not foresee electronic surveillance.
But that does not make it wrong for judges to apply the central value of that amend-
ment to electronic invasions of personal privacy.
750 F2d 970, 995 (DC Cir 1984) (Bork concurring).
" Turner, 114 S Ct at 2458.
2" Id at 2459.
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and cable programming were distinct as a matter of law.272
Therefore, the regulation was indeed content based.
More fundamentally, the content-based test, as applied by
the Court, does not screen for all the manipulations of speech
that the property-based interpretation prevents. Special rules
targeted at the operations or structure of the communication
media inevitably affect content, even if they do not expressly
refer to it. Once again, Turner provides an instructive example.
Broadcasting, unlike cable, does not charge viewers for programs.
Of course, so-called "free television" is not free, but captures its
revenues wholly from advertisements or, in the case of public
television, from government or charitable subventions."' How
an enterprise is financed obviously will have an effect on the
audience it seeks and on the content of the programs it televises.
For instance, commercial broadcasters would put a premium on
reaching the largest possible audience of those people not
reached by other advertising media, such as those who do not
read newspapers or newsmagazines. The predictable result is
down-market programs that appeal to the lowest common denom-
inator. 74 Only restrictions on Congress's ability to create spe-
cial rules for the structure of the communications industry will
prevent Congress from determining how information is transmit-
ted, and, as a result, what information is transmitted.
Moreover, Turner's application of the current First Amend-
ment test for non-content-based restrictions-the O'Brien
test-also shows its inadequacy in protecting speech. O'Brien
requires the courts to weigh the substantiality of the interest as
defined by the government (in this case Congress) against the re-
striction on First Amendment freedoms after giving substantial
deference to Congress's judgment. 5 Public choice theory casts
doubt on the wisdom of deferring to Congress in this context. It
would predict that the more established firms in the video com-
munications industry-in this case, the broadcast sector-will
2 This point is thoroughly discussed in Turner, 819 F Supp at 57-59 (Williams
dissenting). Other strong arguments that the must-carry rules were content based need
not be repeated here. See Turner, 114 S Ct at 2476-79 (O'Connor concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
27 The Court accepted the characterization of broadcasting as free. See Turner, 114 S
Ct at 2469.
24 A similar point in a different context is made in Murray N. Rothbard, For a New
Liberty 111-12 (Macmillan 1973) (noting the effect of broadcasting's revenue structure on
the programs it produces).
"1 Turner, 114 S Ct at 2469-72 (applying O'Brien test). For a discussion of O'Brien,
see notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
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use their resources, shareholders, and employees to influence the
legislature disproportionately. ' Public choice theory also sug-
gests that politicians will favor broadcasters over other compa-
nies because the regulatory licensing scheme that controls
broadcasters gives politicians greater influence over the content
of broadcast materials as compared with other modes of trans-
mission." Thus, legislators will be more likely to accept the
broadcasting industry's arguments about optimal competition and
industry structure, regardless of their merit, and to dress up in
the most neutral-sounding terms the broadcasting industry's
attempt to preserve market share against new competitors.
This may well have occurred in the enactment of must-carry
rules. Congress accepted the broadcast industry's weak argument
that consumer welfare would be harmed in the absence of the
must-carry rules. Broadcasters argued that the cable operators
would have a bottleneck over programming and would discrim-
inate against the broadcasters' programming in favor of their
own. Consumers would be denied programming that they want-
ed.278 These arguments are weak on their own terms. First, ca-
ble operators have an interest in transmitting broadcasters with
popular programming.279 Moreover, in most areas, an inexpen-
sive A/B switch would allow a consumer to change by remote
control from cable to broadcasting, thus providing easy access to broad-
casts that are not carried on cable.2"' Of course, consumers
might not purchase an A/B switch even in response to
broadcasters' advertisements about its availability. Such a re-
sponse would suggest that consumers were not particularly inter-
" See Farber and Frickey, Law and Public Choice at 23-24 (cited in note 18) (discuss-
ing the reasons concentrated interests exert disproportionate influence).
See Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 NYU L
Rev 990, 1054 (1989) (discussing influence of politicians on the distribution of broadcast-
ing licenses).
" See Cable TV Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Hearings on S12 before the Sub-
committee on Communications of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 102d Cong, 1st Sess 217-21 (1991) ("Cable TV Hearings") (statement of
James B. Hedlund, President, Association of Independent Television Stations, Inc.).
" See id at 255 (colloquy between Senator Packwood and Edward 0. Fritts, President
of the National Association of Broadcasters, in which Fritts does not deny that cable
operators would run popular broadcasters).
' See Even If VCR's in the Den, You Can Watch in the Bedroom, Columbus Dispatch
7H (June 4, 1994) (new model TVs have A/B switch, and switches can be added to old
models for less than ten dollars); Cable TV Hearings at 256 (cited in note 278) (response
of James B. Hedlund, President, Association of Independent Television Stations, Inc.,
conceding that A/B switches are technically possible in areas other than those, such as
Manhattan, where there is widespread interference).
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ested in what local broadcasters not already carried by cable had
to offer.
Congress's imposition of the must-carry rules in the 1992
Cable Act is flawed for an even more obvious reason: Congress
rejected arguments made by the government's own expert agency
to include provisions increasing opportunities for broadcast sig-
nals to be carried over wire systems other than cable. Despite the
recommendations of the FCC,28' Congress did not relax provi-
sions of the 1984 Cable Act that prevented telephone companies
from offering television services under their own editorial control
to their subscribers.282 These so-called cross-ownership regula-
tions insulated cable companies from other companies that were
well positioned to offer similar services.8 By relaxing such reg-
ulation, Congress could have accelerated the process by which
other networks, such as fiber optic cables, satellites, or micro-
wave networks of the kind that are emerging in the industry,
would arise to carry valuable programming that cable refused to
carry.2" Because of the narrow focus of the O'Brien test on the
effects of the restrictive regulation at issue, Turner never even
referred to these preexisting regulations. Ironically, therefore, the
Court upheld the must-carry rules on the premise that cable has
substantial power over broadcasting, when legislative regulation
of alternative media was itself partially responsible for maintain-
ing such power as cable possessed.2"
"1 In 1988, the FCC tentatively concluded that restrictions on the telephone
companies' ability to market their own package of television programming to their sub-
scribers should be relaxed. See Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership
Rules, Sections 63.54-63.58, 3 FCC Rec 5849, 5851 (July 20, 1988) (Further Notice of
Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rule Making). In 1992, the FCC formally recommended to
Congress that it relax the cross-ownership rules. See Telephone Company-Cable Televi-
sion Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections 63.54-63.58, 7 FCC Rec 5781, 5786-87 (July 16,
1992) (Second Report and Order, Recommendation to Congress, and Second Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking).
47 USCA § 533(b)(1)-(2) (1991 & Supp 1995). This provision was part of the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-549, 98 Stat 2779, 2785.
' Kellogg, Thorne, and Huber, Federal Telecommunications Law §§ 14.10-14.11 at
716-19 (cited in note 254).
' For discussion of the rise of these networks and how they have decreased the
market power of the owners of traditional media of transmission, see text accompanying
notes 246-55.
' The restrictions on cross-ownership are now under constitutional attack. Fortu-
nately, the courts that have ruled on the challenges have uniformly held that the rules
violate the First Amendment. See Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. v United
States, 830 F Supp 909, 931-32 (E D Va 1993), aff'd, 42 F3d 181 (4th Cir 1994); US West,
Inc. v United States, 855 F Supp 1184, 1193 (W D Wash 1994), aff'd, 48 F3d 1092 (9th Cir
1994); Ameritech Corp v United States, 867 F Supp 721, 737 (N D IlM 1994); BellSouth
Corp v United States, 868 F Supp 1335, 1344 (N D Ala 1994); NYNEX Corp u United
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Under current First Amendment jurisprudence, the judiciary
thus may fail to catch legislative manipulations of the reasons for
regulating information transmission, both because of the com-
plexity of constitutional inquiry and because of the Court's rela-
tive institutional incapacity to look behind the factual determina-
tions of Congress."' But judges also will be disposed to give the
benefit of the doubt to communication enterprises that represent
the status quo for the all-too-human reason that they will be
more familiar with the established systems of communication
than with new systems: they will likely prefer what they know to
what they cannot imagine. Turner's failure to appreciate the
expanding computer and telecommunications networks shows
that a rule that presumptively prohibits Congress from imposing
special rules for different modes of mass communication is partic-
ularly important in a period of rapid technological change such as
the present.
Indeed, to put Turner in proper perspective, it is instructive
to recall an incident from another great period of change. After
the French revolution, the Paris Book Guild sent a petition to an
important committee chairman in the National Assembly. The
petition sought reinstatement of the previously suspended re-
quirement that any book published in France receive the impri-
matur of one of the publishers in the booksellers' guild:
We request, sir, that you glance over it and lend all your
influence to our demands. From these abuses of the freedom
States, 1994 US Dist LEXIS 20414, *4 (D Me).
' Public choice theory would suggest that interest groups have an incentive to make
use of the judiciary's putative institutional incapacity for fact finding by obtaining factual
findings from the legislature that insulate their preferred legislation from constitutional
attacks in court. Politicians would likely acquiesce in this strategy. Insofar as the bargain
they make with interest groups is less likely to be undone by the courts, they can charge
more for the bargain in terms of support and resources from the interest group. For the
original discussion of legislation as a bargain between interest groups and legislatures,
see William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective, 18 J L & Econ 875, 877-83, 888-91 (1975). For a discussion of the
degree to which the judiciary will agree to be a faithful agent of these bargains, see
Thomas W. Merrill, Pluralism, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and the Behavior of the Indepen-
dent Judiciary, 88 Nw U L Rev 396 (1993).
The Turner Court may have implicitly recognized the force of the public choice
consequences of entirely insulating the factual premises of must-carry legislation from
judicial review. The Court required that on remand, the lower court review some of the
factual premises on which the must-carry rules rely, such as the claim that these rules
are necessary to preserve the viability of broadcasting. Turner, 114 S Ct at 2472. Never-
theless, such review is unlikely to ameliorate substantially the problems described above,
if it is done with "substantial deference" to congressional determinations, as the Court
suggests. Id at 2471.
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of the press, yet greater abuses have resulted. Countless
persons who can barely read have established and maintain
shops in every quarter of the capital, hanging over their door
their name and the title of Bookseller, which they have no
scruple about usurping. We dare to hope, sir, ... the Na-
tional Assembly will take the book trade in hand ... in view
of the abuses and thefts as well as the sale of bad books
with which France will soon be infected if everyone is free to
do business as a bookseller. 7
In the annals of the history of information transmission, today's
argument for special regulation of the telecommunications indus-
try arising from the digital revolution will appear as preposterous
as the guild's argument for regulating the low-cost printers that
the industrial revolution made possible.
IV. THE PROMISE OF PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE:
PROPERTY'S CRITIQUE OF SELF-GOVERNANCE AND SELF-
REALIZATION THEORIES OF FREE SPEECH
The prevailing theories of free speech do not view speech as
an individual property right. One popular theory (increasingly so
in academic circles) understands free speech as an instrument for
promoting a collective good-that of democratic self-government.
The other (and probably the reigning theory in the popular imag-
ination) understands free speech as an individual right, but of
self-expression rather than of information transmission. In this
Section, I suggest that the property-rights conception is a useful
correction to the excesses of these other theories.2"
' Plea of Guild of Paris Booksellers, quoted in Carla Hesse, Economic Upheavals in
Publishing, in Robert Darnton and Daniel Roche, eds, Revolution in Print: The Press in
France, 1775-1800 69, 77-78 (California 1989).
' The property-rights view has some kinship both metaphorically and actually with
what has sometimes been understood as a third view of the First Amendment-the
"marketplace of ideas" theory. The theory has venerable roots, originating with Justice
Holmes. See Abrams v United States, 250 US 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes dissenting) ("[Tihe
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market .... That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution."). It is certainly the
case that the real Madisonian First Amendment would lead to an unregulated market in
ideas. But, unlike the marketplace theory, it is rooted in the natural rights and social
contract theory underlying the Constitution. Unlike the marketplace theory, it is not de-
pendent on the empirical claim that the unregulated marketplace is likely to lead to truth
and the metaphysical claim that there is an objective truth. The property theory's inde-
pendence from these claims is important as a matter of theory because the marketplace's
empirical and metaphysical premises have been subject to attack. See C. Edwin Baker,
Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L Rev 964, 974-81 (1978)
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Of the two, the idea of the First Amendment as a collective
right of self-governance has the potential to depart the farthest
from the Madisonian view that free speech was one of the princi-
pal individual rights to be protected by the social contract. The
self-governance rationale for the First Amendment views speech
as a means for promoting a particular form of government rather
than a fixed object to be protected by government. If speech is
essentially a means to another end, the liberties to which we
have become accustomed under the First Amendment may be
utterly transformed if necessary to reach a collective good defined
by others.
The potential for such transformation is now being richly
realized by a growing number of theorists in this tradition, such
as Owen Fiss, Morton Horwitz, Cass Sunstein, Stephen
Gardbaum, and Frederick Schauer.289 In one way or another,
they all view the exercise of private rights in information trans-
mission as threatening the kind of communication necessary for
the flourishing democracy that they believe the First Amendment
is designed to ensure.29 Their understanding of the First
Amendment thus becomes a basis for justifying more regulation
(Marketplace theory must be reconsidered after rejecting its assumption of objective
truth.); Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 Cal L Rev 1101, 1157-64 (1993)
(attacking notion that individuals are sufficiently rational for marketplace to lead to
truth).
' For a fuller discussion of the transformation that would occur should the self-
governance theorists follow their ideas to their logical conclusion, see Martin H. Redish
and Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the Civic Republican Revival in Constitu-
tional Theory: The Ominous Implications, 79 Cal L Rev 267 (1991). For instance, the
interest in collective self-determination would lead some current self-governance theorists
to prohibit many forms of pornography on the theory that pornography subordinates
women and makes it difficult for them to fully participate in the self-governing communi-
ty. Id at 304-310.
" Owen Fiss was the first to see that a thorough understanding of free speech as an
instrument of democracy may require substantial reworking of First Amendment doctrine.
Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 Iowa L Rev 1405, 1410-21 (1986). See
also Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 Harv L Rev 781, 783 (1987) ("[The first amend-
ment does not supply considerations in favor of laissez faire, but rather points toward the
necessity of the activist state."). Others were not far behind. See Frederick Schauer, The
Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principle, 64 U Colo L Rev 935, 949-57 (1993)
(arguing that liberal proposals for government involvement with and regulation of speech
are coherent given existing patterns of resource distribution that disadvantage some
groups in the "marketplace of ideas"); Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of
Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 Harv L Rev 30, 109-16
(1993) (proclaiming the need to free the First Amendment from its "Lochnerization" so
that "weak political dissidents" can participate in democracy); Stephen A. Gardbaum,
Broadcasting, Democracy, and the Market, 82 Georgetown L J 373, 396 (1993) (regulation
of public policy information to assure its diversity and quality is a necessary, albeit not
sufficient, condition of democracy).
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of speech, changing the First Amendment from a shield against
state interference with information transmission rights into a
sword that can be wielded on behalf of state control.291
Sunstein, for instance, invokes no less an authority than James
Madison to claim that the First Amendment requires that gov-
ernment itself play a positive role in supervising systems of infor-
mation dispersion in order to dispel the civic ignorance that
threatens true democracy.2 92 I have already suggested that the
claim that free speech is an instrument for the promotion of self-
government stands the real Madisonian First Amendment on its
head.29' Here I will argue that a property-centered understand-
ing of free speech will be more effective than the self-governance
theory in creating an informed citizenry.
The new First Amendment theorists of the collective self-
governance persuasion point to at least two dangers to democracy
that regulation of information transmission may ameliorate.
First, citizens do not receive a sufficient diversity of views from
the mass media."4 Second, because of competitive pressures,
the mass media fail to give candidates and public policy advo-
cates uninterrupted time to present their views, but instead en-
gage in "soundbite" journalism and concentrate on the "horse
race" aspect of political campaigns.9 Accordingly, these theo-
rists suggest that the government should be empowered to re-
quire the media both to set aside time for "public affairs" pro-
gramming that permits more direct access to the views of candi-
2 Professors Sunstein and Horwitz have been quite explicit in calling for a "New
Deal for Speech." Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech at 17-51 (cited in
note 28); Horwitz, 107 Harv L Rev at 109-16 (cited in note 290). They argue that just as
more government regulation was necessary in the 1930s to promote optimal social wel-
fare, more government regulation of speech is now necessary to promote the optimal
dispersion of information in a democratic society. Thus, speech rights are building blocks
for a just society rather than constitutive of a just society. Critics have already attacked
Sunstein for this reconceptualization, saying that it would work "a radical change in the
way we think about the First Amendment." See Neuborne, 62 U Chi L Rev at 423 (cited
in note 26).
2 Although Sunstein argues that it is a "Madisonian claim that the First Amendment
is associated above all with democratic self-government," see Sunstein, Democracy and the
Problem of Free Speech at xx (cited in note 28), his book never addresses the actual
Madisonian claim that speech is a property right.
s See Part I.
Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech at 56-58 (cited in note 28);
Gardbaum, 82 Georgetown L J at 396 (cited in note 290) (discussing the need for the
appropriate "range" of opinion for democratic deliberation).
29 Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech at 58-62 (cited in note 28).
See also Gardbaum, 82 Georgetown L J at 396 (cited in note 290) (discussing appropriate
quality of information necessary for democratic deliberation).
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dates and policymakers, and to assure that this programming
reflect "diverse views. 296
Examining the fruits of the spontaneously expanding infor-
mation networks suggests that the concerns about quality and
diversity are misplaced. First, our expanding system of informa-
tion networks gives our citizens more quality information than
ever before. For instance, those who wish can now gain access to
uninterrupted speeches of candidates on C-Span and other me-
dia.297 While it may be true that the network news programs do
not provide as much time for candidates' unfiltered speeches as
they once did, the networks now often use additional time to
analyze campaign positions and explain how those positions ad-
vance the candidate's ultimate goal of being elected.' This is
useful information because it enables the citizen to discount ra-
tionally the likelihood that the politician will keep his promises
once elected. Moreover, political science suggests that candidates'
substantive positions are strongly influenced by their position in
the polls and their standing among specific electoral groups.
299
Accordingly, the networks' emphasis on the horse race aspects of
campaigning is also instructive because it permits citizens to
understand politicians' motives and thus better predict their
future behavior in office.
Thus, by providing the kind of information that self-gover-
nance theorists criticize, mass media actually performs a public
service: making some basic notions of the science of public choice
available to the public."' Our decentralized information age,
with its multiplicity of information sources, permits the under-
standing of politicians as self-interested utility maximizers pro-
vided by public choice to compete with other explanations and
predictions of politicians' behavior, including their own speeches.
Citizens can then themselves determine which they find more
useful. Over time, this kind of information may also reduce the
" See, for example, Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech at 55-57
(cited in note 28).
"' The Nielsen television ratings service has estimated that 97 percent of citizens now
have the option of buying cable. See Paul Kagan Associates, Marketing New Media 2-3
(June 20, 1994) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
" For extended discussion of this point, see Tom Rosenstiel, Strange Bedfellows: How
Television and the Presidential Candidates Changed American Politics, 1992 64 (Hyperion
1993).
' The father of all such studies is Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democra-
cy (HarperCollins 1957).
" Public choice is "the application of economics to political science." Mueller, Public
choice II at 1 (cited in note 16). It views politicians as rational utility maximizers. Id at 2.
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deceptiveness of politicians because the benefits from deception
will decline once their promises and maneuvers are explained
and appropriately discounted by the public.30'
Moreover, the property-centered information regime, unlike
the regulatory regime of current self-governance theorists, recog-
nizes that the prospect of being entertained is most likely to
entice citizens to become informed citizens in the first place.0 2
Like other products, information will have to be attractively
packaged to gain a wide audience, and, as with other products,
private entrepreneurs are likely to be more successful than gov-
ernment at doing this, even when packaging public policy infor-
mation.03 Indeed, it is remarkable that in the 1992 presidential
campaign, all the candidates used entertainment fora, such as
late night talk shows, to get their message to the voters. Thus,
yet another disadvantage of any government regulation of po-
litical information transmission is that it would offer bureaucrats
(a group whose previous contributions to human merriment have
been largely inadvertent) the opportunity to jettison formats that
lure millions of viewers in favor of formats that would please
only academics, political junkies, and candidates' close relatives.
The new theorists' arguments for regulation to increase di-
versity fare no better under a property analysis. They are cer-
tainly strangely timed in an age of CNN and C-Span, to say
nothing of America Online, where the concerned citizen can
spend all of his waking hours engrossed in a wide spectrum of
exhaustive public policy expositions, spanning the gamut from
the libertarian Cato Institute to the socialist Institute for Policy
Studies .3° As computer networks become more important in
information delivery, even more diversity can be expected: noth-
ing will prevent a discussion group from being established for
' Insofar as politicians are rational utility maximizers, they will use deception if it
helps them achieve a goal, such as being elected. Insofar as citizens have access to infor-
mation to monitor the deceptiveness of politicians, deception will be less useful and should
decline.
See Posner, 20 Suffolk U L Rev at 23 (cited in note 112).
0 The reason citizens require their news to be entertaining is that information about
collective decisions is unlikely to have very substantial value in advancing their life
prospects. See text accompanying notes 316-17. Therefore, to compete with other infor-
mation reception or other activities that will advance their position more, the news has to
present its public affairs programming in an entertaining manner.
' Elsewhere I have suggested that many academics on the left favor regulation
despite this growth of information sources because of their growing realization that most
of the truths emerging from contemporary social inquiry are not hospitable to collectivist
and egalitarian ideals. Greater regulation of speech may thus retard competition from
these rising ideas. See McGinnis, Commentary at 60 (cited in note 25).
[63:49
Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment
every shade of political and social opinion and every kind of ex-
plication and idea."5
A property-rights theorist recognizes that empowering a
centralized authority to make decisions as to diversity, particu-
larly under such conditions, will threaten rather than increase
the diversity of information. Centralized authorities are unsuc-
cessful at determining the proper prices and quantity of material
products to be produced.0 ' There is no reason to believe that
they will be better at deciding what proportion of ideas should be
transmitted on what pathway of the net.
One response to this argument for laissez-faire information
is that because information has many of the characteristics of a
public good, too little will be produced without government regu-
lation. °7 There are several difficulties with this defense of state
intervention.'( First, in a modern welfare state where the state
redistributes rents and where politicians wield enormous power
over citizens' lives, there are very substantial incentives for inter-
est groups to produce information that advances their agen-
das.3" If the information that the market fails to produce is de-
fined not as information about public policy that will help indi-
viduals take power, but instead as information about public poli-
cy that citizens need, how is the state to determine what infor-
mation is necessary for the citizen? Even where consumer and
market goods are at issue, it is difficult for the regulator to deter-
mine the information for which the rational consumer would be
willing to pay, assuming a perfect market in information.310 If
... See Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty,
59 U Chi L Rev 225, 252 (1992) (criticizing First Amendment theorists who want to
regulate speech to facilitate democratic deliberation for failing to recognize that more
public affairs programming encompassing a wider range of views exists now than ever
before).
' For the theoretical reasons that centralized planning fails to deliver the goods, see
F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am Econ Rev 519 (1945); FA. Hayek,
Competition as a Discovery Procedure, in FA. Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics,
Economics and the History of Ideas 179 (Chicago 1978).
Of course, government may usefully ban products that represent an imminent threat
to life or property, but the new First Amendment democratic theorists are advocating
regulation even in the absence of such direct threats.
... Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech at 68-71 (cited in note 28);
Farber, 105 Harv L Rev at 558-59 (cited in note 30).
... See McGinnis, 35 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1788-89 (cited in note 66).
" See Posner, 20 Suffolk U L Rev at 22 (cited in note 112) (suggesting that public
policy information will be produced as an instrument of gaining power). Thus, we should
expect that public policy information will be produced in the same ample amounts as
advertising.
"' For a discussion of the argument that regulation can induce a better market in in-
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the product at issue is a health plan or a defense strategy for the
entire nation rather than an automobile, it is entirely unclear
how even unbiased regulators would create a more perfect mar-
ket because they would have no principled basis to decide what infor-
mation citizens needed.31'
Indeed, the essential rationale for protecting speech gives us
reason to be more suspicious of government regulation in the
name of creating a public good in information than a material
public good like a bridge.3' Any state regulation of diversity of
any part of the emerging telecommunications and computer net-
works would inevitably permit the state to exert political influ-
ence.313 To determine whether a view has been insufficiently
represented, the state would have to make fine distinctions. Does
the view of a traditional conservative require the response of a
libertarian as well as a liberal? What about a socialist? Such
assessments would dictate the shape of political discourse if a
regime were empowered to promote diversity.
Thus, another advantage of interpreting the First Amend-
ment as a set of property rights of individuals is that such a
concept promotes decentralized decision making about the
strength of emerging social ideas. It permits the social consensus
to be arrived at organically through the decisions of hundreds of
mediating institutions such as the press and universities. It will
result in the evolution of sentiment, thus minimizing social dis-
turbance. A property-rights regime of speech thus promotes social
stability. Ultimately, government regulation probably cannot
suppress the replication of those ideas with a competitive advan-
tage any more than jetties can ultimately protect the shoreline
from being devoured by the sea. Nevertheless, as with the ulti-
mate destruction of artificial sea barriers, the end result of inter-
fering with the process of information transmission is likely to be
more violent.
Making the judiciary rather than the elected branches the
arbiter of diversity would not ameliorate the difficulties inherent
in assigning any part of such an enterprise to a central decision
maker. The judiciary has its own biases, and the assessment of
formation for simple goods, see Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and
the Regulation of Advertising, 90 Harv L Rev 661, 669-75 (1977).
"' For another problem with the public-good defense of government intervention, see
text accompanying notes 318-19.
312 For a fuller discussion of this point, see text accompanying notes 102-12.
313 A more detailed explication of some elements of the argument in this paragraph
can be found in McGinnis, 35 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1789-91 (cited in note 66).
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diversity represents precisely the kind of open-ended standard
that the judiciary cannot undertake according to neutral princi-
ples." Moreover, the judiciary is no better than the legislature
at determining which material products should be produced, and
there is no reason to believe that it will be better at determining
which ideas should be transmitted.
In short, regulation of information transmission will not even
achieve its proclaimed purpose of improving democratic delibera-
tion by promoting a broad public understanding of essential civic
issues. The root of self-governance theorists' error is their oblivi-
ousness to the brute facts of the world that theorists from the
property-rights tradition accept: namely that humans are gener-
ally most interested in information that will be useful or enter-
taining to them, just as they are generally most interested in
useful or enjoyable material products.315 From this it follows
that most citizens will not invest much time or effort in obtaining
or listening to public policy information for two mutually rein-
forcing reasons. First, since the collective decisions will generally
have less effect on the individual citizen than his own private
decisions, he will rationally invest his scarce time and resources
in gathering information about his private enterprises rather
than information about the common enterprise of govern-
ment.31 Second, collective decisions will depend on the votes
and inputs of thousands, if not millions of others, and thus an
individual citizen cannot rationally hope substantially to influ-
ence these decisions by better informing himself." ' Such ratio-
34 For an argument that the original structure of the Constitution presupposes that
the judiciary will act on neutral principles, see John 0. McGinnis, The President, the
Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and
Sunstein, 71 Tex L Rev 633, 665 n 140 (1993).
' The greatest of all modern defenders of property, Adam Smith, recognized self-
interest as the principal wellspring of human behavior. See Smith, Wealth of Nations at
18 (cited in note 52) ("It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the
baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest."). Evolution-
ary biology helps us understand more fully and deeply why it is in the nature of man to
be self-interested. See note 18.
316 The problem of rational disinterest in public policy information is even worse than
might be initially thought. For the same reasons people are uninterested in paying atten-
tion to such information, they are rationally uninterested in training to understand it.
Individuals invest in education and training in order to increase their return on human
capital. See Gary S. Becker, Human Capital:A Theoretical andEmpiricalAnalysis, with Spe-
cial Reference to Education 15-44 (Natl Bureau of Econ Research 2d ed 1975). If they have
no expectation of increasing their return by understanding public policy information, they
will not educate themselves to understand it. This is one of the reasons that public policy
debates in a democracy are conducted at such a low level.
"' See Easterbrook, 107 Harv L Rev at 1331 (cited in note 107) (discussing this
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nal ignorance suggests yet another way in which public policy
information differs from a public good like national defense or
clean air. 8' Unlike national defense and clean air, which citi-
zens passively consume, additional information about public
policy is useless unless citizens make the affirmative decision to
act upon it.319 There is no evidence that regulation of the trans-
mission media will change the average citizen's basic information
calculus so as to encourage the consumption of more public policy
information.
On the other hand, the regime of property rights in informa-
tion transmission does its best to ameliorate civic ignorance. As
the owners of information compete to package it in a form in
which citizens will be interested, information becomes more ac-
cessible. The multiple networks of information also compete to
provide the keys to understanding politicians' behavior, and the
likely effects of that behavior on the citizen. Nevertheless, for
reasons discussed above, the property-rights view of information
transmission also recognizes that there may be inevitable con-
straints on the consumption of information for collective decision
making in a mass democracy. ° That is one of the reasons that
second rationale of "rational ignorance"). Of course, people do vote even though their act
of voting is less likely to determine the election than to land them in the hospital as a
result of an accident on the way to the voting booth. See Mueller, Public choice II at 350
(cited in note 16) (discussing paradox of voting). The fact that an individual will perform
an act in the public interest at small cost to himself does not suggest, however, that he
will invest substantial time in pursuing the public interest. By analogy, people commonly
provide small tips to service providers even when it is clear they will never meet the
tippee again. People do not, however, commonly provide large sums of money to strangers
with the expectation of receiving nothing in return. For low-cost acts of public spiritedness
or charity, one is more likely to follow a custom because it is simply not worth the time
and effort to constantly calculate whether to violate slightly burdensome social norms.
' See Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech at 68-71 (cited in note
28). See also text accompanying notes 310-16.
"' Professor Farber, in analogizing public policy information to a public good such as
clean air, fails to note this important distinction. See Farber, 105 Harv L Rev at 567
(cited in note 30). This difference makes it much less likely that government decision
makers will succeed in producing more of the good actually desired-public policy infor-
mation to which citizens pay attention.
' If civic understanding in a democracy is inevitably limited, we might be better
advised to think of ways of restructuring collective decision making so as to mitigate its
natural defects, rather than distorting the real Madisonian vision of the freedom of
speech. For instance, we might try to follow the example of the First Amendment and
create traditions that would immunize other areas of social life from regulation. We might
also resurrect the keystone of the Framers' structural design-federalism-and thereby
decentralize collective decision making so that citizens would have a greater stake in
decisions that affected them and would therefore pay more attention. See Robert
Delahunty, From Ancient Liberty to the Welfare State, 1994 Pub Interest L Rev 181, 187,
reviewing Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Harvard 1993) (suggesting that
Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment
Framers such as James Madison who shared the property-rights
view were correct in their understanding that the progress of
civilization depended almost entirely on the spontaneous order
created by property rights, including those in information trans-
mission, and not on state intervention beyond action to enforce
those rights."1
In contrast to those who view the First Amendment as a
right of self-governance, those who understand the First Amend-
ment as a right of self-expression would refuse to transform the
Amendment from an individual right into an instrument for a
collective good. 22 They thus would instinctively agree with
property theorists that the government should not be given great-
er power to regulate speech to promote democratic delibera-
tion.3" Nevertheless, the property-rights perspective is a useful
corrective to the self-realization theory as well, if we are to real-
ize the full advantages of commercial speech promised by the
expanding computer and telecommunication networks. Because
mere commerce is somewhat distant from the concept of self-
realization (at least as understood by most academics),324 most
self-realization theorists treat commercial speech as far inferior
to political or artistic speech.2 5 A property-rights regime, how-
ever, suggests that commercial speech should be treated like po-
litical or artistic speech: commercial speech is no less the proper-
ty of its producer than other kinds of speech. The property-based
theory also more accurately tracks the role of information produc-
tion in human nature. 6 Most people are more concerned with
real estate advertisements than political analysis or, one might
government power be devolved from the center to state and local entities "sufficiently
small-scaled for individual citizens' participation in them to make a meaningful differ-
ence").
" For discussion of the Framers' view of the way commerce and free speech would
generate the benefits of civilization, see text accompanying notes 93-96.
' The literature on the First Amendment as a right of self-expression is voluminous.
See, for example, Redish, 130 U Pa L Rev at 591 (cited in note 12).
' The property theorist is able to advance stronger consequentialist arguments about
why attempts to improve democratic deliberation through government regulation are
likely to fail. See text accompanying notes 315-19.
" See Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for
Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 Tex L Rev 777, 783 (1993) (noting academ-
ic bias against commerce).
' See Thomas H. Jackson and John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Econom-
ic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 Va L Rev 1, 5-6 (1979) (arguing that commer-
cial speech should not be protected because it is irrelevant to both the collective self-
governance and individual self-fulfillment rationales for the First Amendment).
" For a full discussion of the place of commercial speech in human nature, see
McGinnis, Information Transmission (cited in note 23).
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add, the creative arts.327 They obtain at least as much satisfac-
tion from the gains from trade that commercial speech facilitates
as from the plays or political rallies they attend.
Even if commercial speech and political speech are equally
protected by the First Amendment, it does not follow that com-
mercial and political free speech doctrines would look identical.
Under the Madisonian First Amendment, speech may be regulat-
ed to prevent harm to life and property of others. This justifi-
cation for regulation is more often implicated by commercial than
by political speech. For instance, if a politician intentionally mis-
leads a group of individuals by promising a tax cut, and in reli-
ance on this promise that group votes for him, the group has not
been defrauded of property because citizens have the right only
to the procedures the Constitution provides for setting taxes.
These procedures include bicameral approval, and presentment to
the President of all bills, including those on taxes," but they
say nothing about the binding nature of campaign promises. On
the other hand, outside of actions authorized by the political
process, an individual has a right to protect his property against
force or fraud, and thus the government may enforce that right
by imposing civil or criminal liability on fraudulent commercial
promises.
The property-rights vision would immunize commercial
speech from regulation unless it threatens property through force
or fraud; thus, it would substantially change current First
Amendment doctrine in this area. The current First Amendment
test permits the state to restrict commercial speech if: (1) the
government interest justifying the regulation is substantial; (2)
the restriction directly advances that interest; and (3) the restric-
tion does so in a manner that provides a reasonable "'fit' between
the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those
ends." 29 Such a test does not require that the regulation of
speech be premised on some threat to property or life. Thus it
can be applied to restrict even truthful advertising of the oppor-
See Daniel Seligman, Keeping Up, Fortune 107, 108 (Dec 28, 1992) (quoting Justice
Scalia as saying: "Of the important decisions I've made in my life, certainly buying a
house is enormously important. I mean, much more important to me than the latest state
of the war in Bosnia.").
US Const, Art I, § 7, cl 2.
See Board of Trustees of State University of New York v Fox, 492 US 469, 480
(1989), quoting Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v Tourism Company of Puerto Rico, 478
US 328, 341 (1986). This test has been most recently reiterated -in Rubin v Coors Brewing
Co., 115 S Ct 1585 (1995) (invalidating federal law prohibiting beer containers from
specifying their alcohol content).
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tunity to engage in otherwise legal conduct.330 By narrowly cir-
cumscribing regulatory power over speech to that necessary to
prevent harm to life or property, a property-based interpretation
of the First Amendment would lead to greater opportunities for
commercial uses of the emerging information communication
networks.
Interestingly, the expanding networks of information should
ultimately prove more effective than the legal regimes of central-
ized authority in reducing commercial fraud. Fraud is an inevita-
ble problem of human society, because the tendency to deceive is
innate in man.3 ' Deception in human society decreases the
overall wealth of society because individuals will less readily
invest in the cooperation that creates wealth insofar as deception
(and therefore promise breaking) is prevalent.332 Social mecha-
nisms thus arise to restrain deception and enforce promises."'
Such social mechanisms fall along a broad spectrum from mecha-
nisms depending on formal centralized authority to mechanisms
that depend on less formal, more decentralized norms." The
efficacy of centralized versus decentralized mechanisms is influ-
" The Court in fact has restricted truthful commercial speech. See Posadas, 478 US
at 344 (upholding restrictions on truthful lottery advertising); Florida Bar v Went For It,
Inc., 115 S Ct 2371, 2381 (1995) (upholding rule prohibiting lawyers from soliciting acci-
dent victims for thirty days after the accident).
"3 Some deception will always be with us because deception is always a potential
characteristic of relations between members of the same species who do not share precise-
ly the same genes. See Robert Trivers, Social Evolution 395-420 (Benjamin/Cummings
1985). Deception is often adaptive in evolutionary terms because an individual, through
deceiving another, can increase his resources or mating opportunities and so be in a
better position to leave more progeny.
' Deceit can decrease social wealth yet still be, in some circumstances, evolutionarily
adaptive because natural selection operates on the individual rather than the group. See
Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene 7-10 (Oxford 1976).
In addition to social mechanisms, evolution has structured our emotional life to
make us reciprocal altruists who will fulfill obligations out of a sense of obligation, grati-
tude, or guilt. See Wright, Moral Animal at 189-209 (cited in note 17); Robert Axelrod,
The Evolution of Cooperation 99 (Basic Books 1984) (suggesting that evolution would
develop cooperative modes of behavior in order to get better results in iterated games of
prisoner's dilemma where lack of cooperation would leave all participants worse off).
' There is a growing literature on ways that decentralized mechanisms may sponta-
neously arise to discipline human behavior and enforce agreements in a fairly orderly
way, even in the absence of a centralized coordinator. See Benjamin Klein and Keith B.
Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J Pol Econ
615 (1981) (examining the value of repeat sales to consumers as a means of enforcing
private contracts). The success of such decentralized enforcement systems may depend
crucially on information costs-the costs of transmitting, storing, and accessing informa-
tion. For discussion of other examples of the manner in which individuals create order
without the benefit of a centralized coordinator, see Ellickson, Order without Law at 230-
264 (cited in note 148).
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enced by the costs of various activities, including the cost of exit-
ing the community and the cost of disseminating information.33
For example, in hunter-gatherer societies it was difficult to
leave the community and still survive. Acts of deception were
therefore generally more costly to the deceiver than in the more
mobile and anonymous societies that have characterized the West
in the last millennium." 6 These societies have had to rely more
on centralized enforcement mechanisms until the cost of trans-
mitting information declined, making it more cost effective to
monitor the reputations of the transient population. For instance,
when information costs were high, debtor prisons may have been
necessary to enforce obligations. With lower information costs,
much of the discipline in personal credit markets is imposed by
information circulated by credit agencies. 37
Today, as information costs fall still further, one can accumu-
late a broader array of data on people's past actions. Indeed,
private entrepreneurs are already seizing the prospect of limiting
deception through use of the Internet.33 The greater ease in
evaluating people's integrity should deter deception across a wide
range of activities just as access to credit ratings deters default
on debts.
Of course, individuals may want to keep some information
about themselves private.339 Contract can accomplish this objec-
' For another view of the way information costs bear on the structure of society, see
Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice 147-50 (Harvard 1983). Posner seems to view
changing information costs as the prime engine of social change. While I certainly agree
that information costs are very important, I believe that other material changes such as
increased mobility and population dispersion also play important roles.
See Wright, Moral Animal at 38 (cited in note 17).
For a general discussion of the power of "relational" as opposed to purely legal
sanctions in contract, see Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 Wis L
Rev 465, 468-69.
' See Leslie Eaton, Gumshoes of Cyberspace Out to Save Investors Pain, NY Times
D1 (Aug 18, 1994) (discussing use of the Internet to research public records, such as
bankruptcy, arrest, and licensing records).
' We can certainly expect legislative attempts to restrict such accumulation of infor-
mation in the name of "privacy." Such efforts are generally misguided because they
interfere with the valuable right of information transmission in order to enforce a concept
of privacy that is scarcely coherent. When people say they want the state to keep informa-
tion secret, what they really mean is that they want the state to protect their right to "se-
lective disclosure of information." See Posner, Economics of Justice at 232-34 (cited in note
335) (arguing that individuals wish to manipulate what others know of them for their own
personal gain). The so-called right of privacy (in the sense of a legal right to keep informa-
tion secret) thus facilitates deception-one of the greatest natural barriers to value
creation. Thus, so long as individuals obtain information without violating the property
rights of others, they should generally be able to disseminate the information free from
state interference.
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tive by permitting individuals to disseminate information for only
limited purposes, thus preserving its privacy against the world in
general.' Modern technology may in fact make such privacy
ultimately easier to enforce. Bits of information may be sur-
rounded by other bits that will limit the list of people authorized
to access the embedded bits to those legally entitled to do so."'
Cryptography also will help individuals keep information se-
cret. 42 For instance, encryption will be used to authenticate
and keep secret digital signatures that will permit the use of elec-
tronic cash, thus facilitating the commercial use of the net.343
Nevertheless, the information individuals do disseminate
about themselves in the course of their transactions will be more
efficiently gathered and organized.3"' Thus, the global village
may be creating conditions that better approximate the condi-
tions of villages of hunter-gatherers where monitoring reputa-
tions was relatively easy. In addition to its many other virtues,
the spontaneous order of the expanding net-particularly its
commercial paths--can provide a decentralized mechanism for
keeping us honest. 4
" See note 141 (discussing the availability of contract to preserve retention value in
information that is not subject to copyright).
"' See Negroponte, being digital at 15-17 (cited in note 246) (discussing the uses of
bits).
"4 For a comprehensive discussion of cryptography and the new communication
technology, see Froomkin, 143 U Pa L Rev 709 (cited in note 243). Like Professor Lessig, I
am not as concerned about the concept of a "clipper chip" that allows the government to
break the code and thereby eavesdrop on conversations. See Lawrence Lessig, The Path of
Cyberlaw, 104 Yale L J 1743, 1751-52 n 23 (1995) (suggesting administrative methods
that would prevent government abuse of the clipper chip). Indeed, since the government is
permitted to eavesdrop on information transmitted in other modes (over phones or even
spoken in one's own house) so long as it meets specified criteria, I do not believe a clipper
chip is imposing special burdens on cyberspace in violation of the First Amendment, so
long as the intercepts facilitated by the clipper chip meet similar Fourth Amendment
criteria. But see Froomkin, 143 U Pa L Rev at 812-23 (arguing that clipper chip may
violate the First Amendment).
u Froomkin, 143 U Pa L Rev at 720-21 (cited in note 243).
We can expect such information to accumulate. Individuals will naturally wish to
retain the right to disseminate information about their course of transaction with others,
so that they can release this information if the transaction goes badly. Retaining the right
of dissemination is a kind of hostage-taking that may deter bad behavior by an
individual's transactional counterpart. Compare Klein and Leffler, 89 J Pol Econ at 630-33
(cited in note 334) (suggesting that consumer-goods companies advertise to create a
reputation that consumers can then hold hostage: quality is enforced by the danger that
the corporate reputation will be eroded by consumer complaints about low-quality prod-
ucts).
" Decentralized enforcement has important advantages over centralized enforcement
because centralized enforcement concentrates power in institutions whose actions are
difficult to discipline. Market forces generally do not discipline centralized enforcement
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CONCLUSION
Under the real Madisonian theory of the First Amendment,
the government would have only a very circumscribed role with
respect to the emerging networks of communication. This role
would be limited largely to enforcing regulations that are applied
to business enterprises generally. Given the great opportunities
for competition among networks, spontaneous order of the kind
represented by emerging computer nets will create multiple op-
portunities for information-rich exchanges.
Centralized authorities generally lack the information to
improve on the beneficial competition among ideas that is inten-
sified by a property-based First Amendment regime. Indeed,
these centralized authorities have powerful incentives to distort
that competition. Thus, in a world of global competition, societies
that permit the government to regulate the flow of information
are greatly disadvantaged compared with societies that continue
to permit unfettered information transmission. The United States
was one of the first republics ever to enshrine freedom of speech
in its Constitution, a freedom originally understood as rooted in
an individual's natural property right in his information. It is by
returning to its roots that the First Amendment will best fulfill
its promise in the age of an ever expanding network of telecom-
munications.
authorities, and citizens have only limited opportunities for monitoring and controlling
centralized enforcement authorities through the exchange of information in the public
sphere. See notes 315-19 and accompanying text.
